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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THREE ESSAYS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT
The local government tax-exempt debt market is a growing, and complex, sector
of public finance. As local governments turn to debt financing the factors that contribute
to interest costs of that debt have become important considerations for local government
officials and politicians. Governance at the local level involves a network of overlapping
governments some of which share a tax base. This system of overlapping governments
that share a tax base are subject to externalities that arise from taxation, expenditures, and
debt. These externalities are usually analyzed in terms of tax or expenditure reactions, but
there are implications for local government debt as well. For example, it can be shown
that overlapping governments that share a tax base and issue debt can increase the interest
costs paid on bonds by a higher level government. Further complicating the debt
situation of local governments is the prevalence of a variety of special districts with the
authority to issue tax-exempt debt. These special districts may have the authority to issue
debt, but little is known about their financing processes. By comparing how different
types of government approach the credit rating process this dissertation compares risk
assessment of traditional municipalities and special districts. Through this comparison
similarities and differences in the credit rating process across types of local governments
can be identified. To explore these issues of local government debt several advanced
econometric techniques are used to estimate various models. For example, by using
semiparametric techniques a less restrictive estimation methods can be used to address
important issue in local government finance.
KEYWORDS: Public Finance, Municipal Securities, Local Government, Public Debt,
Public Policy
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Chapter One
Introduction to Debt Competition
Introduction
It is well known that local governments are an integral piece of the governance
system in the United States. Local governments are the first place that citizens turn to
when problems arise, and deal directly with both other local governments and foreign
governments. Yet they receive far less attention than state and federal governments in
both academic literature and popular media. Understanding the complex relationship
between governments in a federalist system is of considerable interest for economists,
political scientists, and policy researchers. Within each state exists hundreds of separate
governments including counties, cities, townships, school districts, special districts, and
municipal districts. Most of these districts have the power to tax, set regulation, and issue
their own debt. The result is complicated network of various policies affecting citizens
and corporations alike, and this system continues grow.
As this system of governments grows more layers of government are added, and
the level of strategic interactions among them increases. According to the 2007 United
States Census of Governments since 1972 the total number of local governments has
increased from 78,269 to 89,476. The make-up of type of local governments has also
changed. As Figure 1.1 shows the overall number has increased, but the number of
special districts has increased significantly while the number of school districts has
actually decreased. With an increasing number of local governments with debt issuing
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authority understanding the relationships between different types of governments
becomes important.

Figure 1.1 Number of Governments by Type
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Supplement to the
Federal Reserve Bulletin, monthly.

As the amount of federal and state funding to local governments has decreased
and citizen willingness to accept higher taxes remains unchanged local governments have
turned to issuing debt to fund both short and long term projects. As shown in Figure 1.2,
the amount of general obligation debt issued by state and local governments has grown
significantly over the last twenty years. This increased amount of state and local debt
combined with the increased number of local governments over the same period suggests
that understanding the complexities of local government debt is an important policy
issue.
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Figure 1.2 Annual Issues of State and Local Debt
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There are myriad of interesting and important topics in local government debt. As
the number of special districts grows governance at the local level becomes a complex
web of governments. The result is many different local governments performing
complimentary as well as competing services. These governments often overlap in their
tax bases and service delivery areas, and are almost always given the power to issue debt.
Understanding the interactions between these overlapping local governments is an area of
study that has serious implications for local government finance. Furthermore,
understanding the differences between the various types of special districts, especially in
comparison to the traditional municipal governments in terms of debt issuance, is an area
that has received little attention.
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It is commonly understood that the operating budgets of state and local
governments are under strict requirements to be balanced. Debt may be used by state and
local governments to expand the resources available to finance new construction of
buildings and other tangible assets. However, debt is not a source of revenue; debt is a
financial obligation that commits future taxes and fees in order to make the financial
resources available in the present. The amount that a government can borrow is restricted
by the jurisdictions capacity to repay the liability, which depends upon the property and
income wealth of the citizens that reside in the jurisdiction. Property, sales, and income
are the three major tax bases utilized by state and local governments. These tax bases
have a limited capacity to support debt. Very often these tax bases are shared among
multiple jurisdictions such as cities, school districts, counties and special districts. As a
result, these overlapping jurisdictions must compete with each other for the available debt
capacity. Every time one jurisdiction issues debt, it reduces the amount available for the
other jurisdiction to borrow.

Markets for State and Local Debt
State and local governments issue municipal bonds to finance infrastructure used
for a wide range of purposes including education, utilities, public buildings, hospitals,
and transportation. While state and local governments may borrow money from a bank
through a note, loan or mortgage, the majority of the debt held by state and local
government is in the form of tax-exempt bonds. This is because qualifying municipal
bonds are exempt from the investor’s taxable income and therefore offer lower interest
rates. Of the $434.2 billion of debt issued by state and local governments in 2010, about
4

thirteen percent was issued by states, twenty percent was issued by cities and counties,
and the remaining sixty-seven percent was issued by special districts and authorities.
The volume of outstanding state and local debt exceeded $2.4 trillion in 2009 (Federal
Reserve Board of Governors).

Municipal bonds are issued as general obligation debt or revenue backed debt.
General obligation (GO) bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing
government, which means the general tax revenues of the government are obligated to
pay the bonds. Revenue backed debt, or non-guaranteed debt, is supported from
dedicated fees or other earmarked sources of revenue. It is the general obligation bonds
that are most subject to intrajurisdictional competition, because the backing for GO bonds
comes from a shared tax. However, the bond market generally considers revenue bonds
as a moral obligation of the jurisdiction where shortfalls in the pledged revenues may be
fulfilled through general revenue sources. This moral obligation contributes indirectly to
the competition for debt among overlapping jurisdictions. Leased backed bonds are a
type of revenue bonds, but they are different in that the pledged revenues are future
appropriations through the general fund or other tax revenues. For this reason leased
backed bonds induce more intrajurisdictional competition than a typical revenue bond.
Even the fees pledged for a generic revenue bond may be influenced by the actions of
overlapping jurisdictions because the overlapping jurisdictions share a common
population and income base.

One important element in determining the price, or interest costs, of a bond is the
credit rating. Credit ratings are purchased by the government issuing a bond from one or

5

more credit rating agency such as Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch. These rating
signal to the market the risk of default for a government bond. Governments make
several decisions related to credit ratings. They decide whether or not to purchase a
rating, how many ratings to purchase, and who to purchase ratings from. While the
decision making process may be different for each individual government there are
several plausible approaches. A government may first decide to purchase a rating, then
decide how many rating, then decide from whom to purchase a rating. Alternatively they
may make the decisions simultaneously. For example, they may decide from the start to
purchase all three ratings. Differences in the decision making process by type of
government are explored in chapter three.

The use of debt, type of debt issued, and credit rating decisions are all tied to the
pursuit of the lower interest rates on government bonds. Lower interest rates mean that
the government is paying less to borrow of the life of the bond. There are several
methods for calculating municipal interest costs. Net interest cost (NIC) and true interest
cost (TIC) are the two most common. Of the two true interest cost has become the
preferred method in both academic literature and practice. TIC is more complicated than
NIC because it takes into account the time value of money to calculate an internal rate of
return on a bond, whereas NIC produces the average annual cost of debt. Two bids may
have the same NIC but different TIC if one involves higher interest payments in the early
maturities of the issue and lower interest payments in the later maturities (Fabozzi and
Fabozzi 1989).

6

Constraints on Debt Financing

There are various constraints that are placed on state and local government debt
that dictate the amount, and terms, of debt that can be issued. States can institute
constitutional debt limits that restrict the amount that can be issued by state governments.
One estimate by the National Association of State Treasurers (2001) finds that twentyseven states have some combination of constitutional or statutory limitations on general
obligation debt. In contrast, only four states restrict revenue or nonguaranteed debt.
Hackbart et al. (2004) identify fourteen states as having policies with “umbrella policies”
which encompass both GO and nonguaranteed debt. States can also impose taxation and
expenditure limits for local governments, which will indirectly limit the amount of GO
debt those local governments can issue.
This dissertation will study local government debt using data from the State of
Texas. The Texas Constitution prohibits the issuances of additional state debt if the
percentage of debt service payable by general revenue in any fiscal year exceeds 5% of
the average of unrestricted general revenue for the past three years. The state of Texas
currently has a AA credit rating from Standard and Poor’s, a Aa1 from Moody’s, and a
AA+ from Fitch. Texas limits local government debt indirectly through state statues that
set maximum ad valorem tax rates per $100 of assessed property value. The rates vary by
government type, but all governments must generate sufficient funds based on annual ad
valorem tax collections to provide for the payments of the principal and interest no all
GO debt. All local debt issuances must be approved by the Office of the Attorney
General – Public Finance Division and registered with the Texas Comptroller of Public
Accounts.
7

Governments can also have indirect or informal debt limitations. The informal
debt limitation is not established through law, but is determined by the amount of debt a
jurisdiction may issue without altering its credit rating. Thus, informal debt limits are
determined by credit quality of the jurisdiction and the bond markets. These marketdriven constraints are referred to as the debt capacity or debt affordability of a
government. Debt affordability and debt capacity are related, but distinct terms. Debt
affordability is defined as the amount of debt that any one government can financially
support. Debt capacity is more specifically defined as the level of debt and/or debt
service relative to current revenues that an issuing entity could support without creating
undue budgetary constraints that might impair the issuer’s ability to repay outstanding
bonds or make timely debt service payments (Denison et al. 2006). One practical
approach to managing debt levels is the use of “rules of thumb “ that might include
setting ceilings on debt service payments as a percentage of state government
expenditures, total debt per capita or other level of debt or debt service ratios.
While it is generally agreed upon that debt affordability and debt capacity are
important factors in debt management, there is little consensus on how to measure
affordability. There is no clear standard for making judgments about the specific amount
of debt that is affordable for a jurisdiction. A theory put forth by Hildreth and Miller
(2002) argues that debt affordability depends on factors of economic concentration in
revenue sources, and interjurisdictional coordination. They posit that resources bases are
at risk of being drawn upon by multiple jurisdictions. In their framework the ability to
repay debt with balanced revenue sources is significantly different than the ability to
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repay with concentrated revenue sources when overlapping jurisdictions are competing
with each other.
Empirically there has been little done to test theories of debt affordability or
capacity. Martell (2007) is the one exception. Martell looks at the effect of jurisdictional
overlap, specifically the effect of special districts, on county debt affordability. The study
investigates Jefferson County, Colorado, and finds that the number of overlapping
jurisdictions is negatively related to various levels of debt. This would suggest that the
number of overlapping jurisdictions may not be a concern for local governments in
regard to debt affordability. Martell also found that the type of overlapping jurisdictions
did matter, and that metropolitan districts yielded much greater debt burdens relative to
municipal governments.
Government jurisdictions face restrictions in the amount of debt that can be issued
as a result of formal (legal) debt policies, informal administrative rules, and fiscal
constraints of debt affordability. For example, the bond referendum is a common legal
restriction on general obligation bond issues requiring new bond issues to receive voter
approval. A bond referendum may have the same effect as a debt limit if citizens vote
down bond issues that exceed the public’s notion of acceptable debt levels. These
constraints can lead to competition among departments within a single government,
between different government entities, and throughout various levels of government.
These departments and governments compete over the ability to issue debt, the amount
they can issue, and the interest rates they receive on that debt. Bond referendum laws and
debt limits, both formal and informal, restrict the amount of debt that can be issued and

9

create a scarcity in debt financing. This scarcity results in a competition for debt
resources.

Special Districts
The term local government is wide reaching and includes the traditionally studied
municipalities such as cities and counties as well as the broad category of special
districts. As shown in the introduction (Figure 1.1) the number of special districts has
grown over the last thirty years. The classification of special district is a complicated
category. Special districts are independent, political subdivisions of the state, and are also
known as public authorities. Their jurisdictional reach is usually less than state wide,
although may include multiple counties. They are organized for the purpose of
performing governmental or other prescribed functions within limited boundaries, and are
created to “fill the gaps” that may exist in the services of cities and counties. These
governments are associated with less political oversight and more business like
management practices. Special districts typically have limited taxing and bonding
powers, which allows them to be used to get around constitutional limits on debt and
taxation.
A common hypothesis in literature on special districts is that most fiscal rules are
applied to traditional municipalities more than special districts so policymakers
circumvent rules by diverting polices to special districts. A common means of
circumvention is through the sale of debt, because while balanced budget requirements
exist is most states special districts are less transparent, and harder to hold accountable. It
is also argued that special districts are able to issue more non-guaranteed debt because of
10

less regulation (Bennett and DiLorenzo 1982; Marlow 1995). Bunch (1991) finds that
states with constitutional or statutory debt limitations tend to create more special districts
than states without limitations. There have been several studies that support the general
hypothesis that state limits on local debt or spending also stimulate the creation of special
districts (Joyce and Mullins 1991; Nelson 1990). In addition, when states restrict only
cities fiscal powers, the county may assume more service responsibilities. If both cities
and counties fiscal powers are limited more special districts are created to handle service
responsibilities (McCabe 2000).
The literature on special districts and public finance has focused on the use of
special districts to circumvent, or relieve services from, cities and counties. Little
attention has been paid to the fact that as more special districts are created they will
compete in the debt market against each other and the existing governments. This
relationship is further complicated when it is considered that cities, counties, and special
districts may share the same tax base. Therefore while states may create special districts
to get around debt limitations an unintended consequence is that they are creating their
own worst competition in debt markets.
Nature of Debt Competition
There are several ways debt competition can manifest itself within state and local
governments. On form is when state agencies within a single state government can
compete with each other in interagency debt competition. A potentially more complicated
relationship is that state government can compete with local governments within the
state. Also, various levels of local governments can compete with each other in intrastate
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vertical debt competition. Finally, local governments of the same or similar type can
compete with each other in intrastate horizontal debt competition.
In states with balanced budget requirements and binding limits on the amount of
state debt that can be issued, policy makers are forced to choose among several types of
budgetary tradeoffs. One tradeoff is among different agencies that may have different
infrastructure needs. Both state tax revenues and new debt resources can be used to
acquire capital assets in a given year. However taxes are generated each year while debt
issued is a liability that carries over into future fiscal periods. Therefore, debt needs to be
managed on two dimensions in regard to debt capacity and competition. The first
dimension is the accumulated debt balances issued for various purposes in the past, and
the second dimension is the annual amount of debt that is newly issued for various
purposes. Debt limit policies and financial constraints will restrain the amount of debt a
state and composite agencies may issue and therefore force competition for available
bond capacity. The debt issuance allocation process can produce winners and losers
among those agencies competing for available credit.
Denison et al. (2009) reports that trade-offs for debt resources occur between the
highway debt and other state debt in those states with formal umbrella debt policies. In
states without umbrella debt limits there is not intrastate competition among the highway
debt and all other state debt. Instead, the relationship is complimentary in that increases
in all other debt leads to dramatic increases in highway debt. It appears that the intensity
of the intrastate competition for debt resources depends on the amount of debt “slack”
available to the state and whether binding debt limits are on both general obligation and

12

revenue bonds. The states that decreased their overall debt show most evidence of
intrastate competition for the remaining debt resources.
The second type of debt competition is vertical competition between state and
local governments. This type is possibly the most complicated relationship because the
jurisdictions are overlapping. Overlapping jurisdictions mean that two governments are
providing services and levying taxes to a shared geographic area. This is relevant for debt
management because as one government issues general obligation debt it obligates future
tax revenues. If the issuing government shares the tax base in part or entirety with another
government, then the second government to issue debt may face a higher default risk and
interest costs. This creates a debt competition scenario where governments compete on
timing and issue size of their debt to receive more favorable municipal interest costs.
Vertical debt competition can occur between various levels of state and local
governments. One key factor in vertical debt competition is whether the state’s debt
issuance is centralized or decentralized. Some states issue the majority of debt at the
state level and pass funds through to local governments, while other states issue relatively
little at the state level and allow local governments to issue debt as needed. The map in
Figure 1.3 shows a breakdown by state of the percentage of total state and local debt that
was issued by local governments in 2009. In 2009 Rhode Island had the lowest
percentage of debt issued by local governments at around 22%. Conversely Tennessee
had the highest with 87%. In general the map shows that southern states tend to have
higher proportions of government debt issued at the local level compared to northeastern
states.
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Figure 1.3 Local Proportion of Total State and Local Debt

Vertical debt competition can also arise between different levels of local
governments. As an example of vertical debt competition among local governments,
Figure 1.4 is a map of Denton County which is in north central Texas about 40 miles
north of the Dallas- Fort Worth Metro area. The municipalities are darkest with the main
city being the City of Denton right in the middle. In addition to the county and city
governments there are several school districts (grey outline), municipal districts, and
other special districts.
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Figure 1.4 Denton County, Texas, and Overlapping Jurisdictions

Table 1.5 is a list from a recent Denton County Bond issue with all of the
overlapping jurisdictions and their tax rates for the county. In total Denton County has
thirty-four overlapping cities, seventeen overlapping school districts, and seventeen
overlapping special districts for a total of $4.4 billion in direct and overlapping debt
principal. This means that Denton County has $6,907 per capita in direct and overlapping
outstanding debt. This total amount is not transparent, and therefore citizens may be
unaware of their total debt burden. Denton County is not a unique government in the
number of overlapping school districts and special districts. This “stacking” of local
15

governments with debt issuing authority is likely to result non-transparent total debt
burdens across the country.
Table 1.1 Denton County Official Bond Statement

Taxing Entity
Cities
Carrollton
Frisco
Lewisville
Flower Mound
Denton
Other Cities
School Districts
Little Elm ISD
Northwest ISD
Frisco ISD
Denton ISD
Lewisville ISD
Other School
Districts
Special Districts
Denton FWSD #1E
Denton FWSD #1D
Denton Co FWSD 9
Denton Co FWSD 10
Denton FWSD #6
Other Special
Districts

As of

2009
Tax
Rate

Net Debt
Principal
Outstanding

Percent
Overlapping

Amount
Overlapping

2/28/2010
1/9/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009

0.6178
0.465
0.4402
0.4497
0.6665

165285000
274045194
106190000
124900000
141580000

49.69%
35.63%
99.22%
100.00%
100.00%

82,130,117
97,642,303
105,361,718
124,900,000
141,580,000
326,594,781

9/30/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009
11/30/2009

1.54
1.355
1.39
1.49
1.4087

136313148
512158638
1144315745
626713437
994835121

100.00%
43.40%
26.71%
100.00%
100.00%

136,313,148
222,276,849
305,646,736
626,713,437
994,835,121
429,009,522

9/30/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009
9/30/2009

0.9
0.9
1
1
1

25000000
27975000
28125000
33590000
60574983

100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%

25,000,000
27,975,000
28,125,000
33,590,000
60,574,983
115,187,780

Total Gross Overlapping Principal
3,883,456,495
Denton County
0.2498
513080733
100%
513,080,733
Total Direct and Overlapping Principle
4,396,537,228
Ratio of Direct and Overlapping Debt Principal to 2009 Net Taxable Value
8.24%
Total Direct and Overlapping Debt Principal Per Capita
6,907
Source: Preliminary Office Statement. Denton County Bond Counsel. CUSIP Prefix 248775.
June 1, 2010
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The third type of debt competition is horizontal competition across local
governments of the same level. This competition is similar to the state-to-state
competition where two or more local governments of the same or similar type compete to
issue municipal securities. This competition can occur between local governments that
share a border or between local governments that are similar in their socioeconomic
makeup. For example, cities may compete for debt if they share common risk factors
resulting from attributes such as similar population and industry composition.
Horizontal form of competition is tied to the well known the tax competition
literature. Tax competition among local governments has its roots in Tiebout (1956) who
hypothesized that residents would sort themselves into different local governments based
on their preferences for public goods and services and the associated tax costs. Since
residents are mobile, and jurisdictions are in a competition for those residents,
competition results in a type of sorting of citizens into municipalities that offer a mix of
goods and services to match citizen preferences. The result will be tax structures that
represent those preferences, and those tax structures will dictate the debt capacity and
affordability of a local government. In this way debt competition is inherently tied to tax
competition among local governments.

Consequences of Intrastate Debt Competition
Excessive intrastate competition among states and local governments may
produce several adverse effects. One outcome is that excessive competition may result in
a shortage of debt capacity available to the other jurisdictions desiring to issue debt. As
previously discussed, the jurisdiction who issues bonds first will have the advantage in
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terms of reduced credit risk and interest costs. The incentive for jurisdictions who issue
bonds first will be to maximize the size of the bond issues in order to lock in debt at
lower interest rates. Without coordination, competing jurisdictions may find that the
available debt capacity gets used without consideration of the holistic priorities of the
area.
Intrastate debt competition influences interest rates primarily from the supply
perspective. The supply of bonds in the markets is influenced by both horizontal and
vertical competition, and the increase in bond supply will put downward pressure on
bond prices and drive up interest rates.
Fragmented financial reporting of debt obligations of overlapping jurisdictions
may reduce the public transparency of the overall debt burden. Referring back to Table
1.1, we see that Denton County has just over $513 million in outstanding direct debt.
Since Denton County has a population of around 636 thousand, the direct debt per capita
is $806 per person. However, the debt per capita number for just the county dramatically
underestimates the real debt burden to residents in Denton County since the total direct
and overlapping debt is $6,907 per capita. Lack of transparency may lead to excessive
debt (and tax) burdens.

Dissertation Chapters
The variety of interesting research topics in local government debt serves as the
motivation for this dissertation. The following chapters are a series of three essays that
explore local government debt from three different perspectives. All three essays deal
with local government’s debt issuances. The first essay takes a fiscal federalism approach
18

in that it looks at fiscal externalities created by debt, and the effects of local government
borrowing on county government municipal interest costs. The second essay drills down
to explore the differences between types of special districts and compares how those
governments approach the risk assessment, and debt issuing process to traditional
municipalities. The third essay seeks to expand the limited set of econometric tools that
are used to model local government interest costs. The goal of this dissertation is to
address three distinct research questions:
1. Do overlapping governments create debt externalities, and if so what is the
effect of those externalities on interest costs?
2. Are there differences between local government types in the selection of a
credit rating agency or the number of ratings purchased?
3. Can semiparametric techniques be used to model municipal interest cost, and
are the underlying assumptions of existing OLS models valid?
Addressing this collection of research questions increases our understanding of
local government debt in several ways. First, it adds to our understanding of the
relationship across governments that share tax bases in debt issues. Second, it provides
some empirical evidence regarding the differences in how types of local governments in
evaluating risk as well as some general descriptive statistics about the credit ratings of
special district governments. Third, the current set of econometric tools used to analyze
local government finance will be expanded. By utilizing advanced econometrics to
analyze local government debt not only can the field move forward with the ability to
answer different empirical questions, but existing questions can be answered with more
precision and fewer restrictions.
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More specific findings of this dissertation include the effect of overlapping debt
on interest costs, a comparison of the credit rating decision process for local
governments, and an alternative method for modeling municipal interest costs. In chapter
two both ordinary least squares and two stage least squares models are used to show that
the aggregated sub-county amount of debt that overlaps with a county government
increases the county interest costs on tax-supported bonds. In addition as the number of
overlapping sub-county governments that issue the debt increases the county interest
costs increase.
In chapter three uses the theory of financial intermediation to explore differences
in local government credit rating agency decisions. A multivariate probit model is used to
estimate the effect government type has on the decision to be rated by each of the three
main credit rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch). Results show that
cities and counties are similar in their rating decisions, and that school districts behave
more like cities and counties than other special districts. Results also suggest that special
districts are not the same in their rating decisions. For example, health districts are more
likely to be rated by Moody’s while other districts are more likely to be rated by Standard
and Poor’s. A negative binomial model is also used to estimate the effect of government
type on the number of credit ratings purchased. The implications for these findings
suggest that risk assessment by different types of governments will determine the prices
paid on their debt. Different debt prices for local government types can inform the
assignment of responsibilities across local governments.
In addition to contributing to academic literature the results from this dissertation will
have implications for several policy implications. These recommendations include the
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effects of adding additional local governments in terms of debt levels and municipal
interest costs. Also, these essays point out several important recommendations about
strategies for local governments to achieve the lowest true interest cost through either
pooled debt issues, or by strategic issuing through various types of corporate government
entities. These policy implications also include ideas for future research on local
government debt, and the methods used in its analysis.

Copyright © Robert. A Greer 2013
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Chapter 2
Vertical Debt Externalities in Overlapping Governments

Introduction
Competition among local governments is a phenomenon that has been discussed
and studied extensively in economics and policy literature. One side argues that
competition is good, keeps tax rates low, and government services competitive. Another
side argues that competition does not result in welfare gains, at best merely moves
resources between communities, and at worse is welfare decreasing. In that redistribution
governments lose revenues and resources competing over attracting businesses through
incentives or tax rates. The arguments are well developed and consider a variety of
perspectives on taxation, expenditures, citizen welfare, and industry growth. One aspect
of the argument that is less developed has been the role local government debt plays in
competition. Debt competition may influence governments in different ways, but in
general jurisdictions are competing for the ability to issue debt at the lowest interest cost
it can obtain.
State and local government debt has been on the rise for the last twenty years. As
shown in Figure 2.1 state and local debt has increased as a whole (real dollars), but the
amount of debt issued by special districts has far outpaced other government types. The
recent recession and media attention to national debt issues combined with several high
profile municipal bankruptcy filings including Jefferson County, Alabama and
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania that resulted from significant municipal debt obligations has
drawn attention to the issue of local government debt. Trying to measure and analyze
local government debt and be a tricky endeavor, because the current governance
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landscape is a complex network of overlapping jurisdictions including a variety of special
districts.

Figure 2.1 Annual Issues of State and Local Debt
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statistical Supplement to the
Federal Reserve Bulletin, monthly.

In the United States within each of the fifty states exists hundreds of separate
governments including counties, cities, townships, school districts, special districts, and
municipal utility districts to name a few. Most of these districts have the power to tax, set
regulation, and issue their own debt. The result is a complicated network of various
policies affecting citizens and corporations alike. The fiscal policies of one government
may directly or indirectly affect other governments through both horizontal and vertical
interactions. One form of these interactions is through fiscal competition. Fiscal
competition may take a variety of forms including through tax policy and debt capacity.
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As an illustration consider Denton County, which is a county in north-central
Texas just north of the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex. In the official statement for a recent
2010 issue of permanent improvement bonds all taxing entities that overlapping with
Denton County were listed with their tax rates and amount of net debt principal
outstanding. In total Denton County had 68 overlapping tax entities including 34 cities,
17 school districts, and 17 special districts. This resulted in around $4.4 billion worth of
overlapping outstanding debt for this one county. When the own outstanding debt for
Denton County is added in residents had $6,907 worth of total direct and overlapping
debt principal per capita. It is unclear whether residents of the 68 lower level jurisdictions
that are contributing to that total are aware of that situation, but it almost certainly has
implications for risk of default, interest cost payments, and fiscal sustainability of the
area. Denton County is not alone in this situation. In fact the number of total local
governments has increased by over ten thousand in the last thirty years. Figure 2.2 shows
that while the number of school districts have gone down, the number of special districts
is on the rise.
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Figure 2.2 Number of Governments by Type
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This paper adds to the current literature by contributing a relatively simple model
of debt competition between governments with a shared tax base in a second-best world,
which is an area that has yet to be fully explored in the literature. The theoretical
argument is that for a given tax base there is a set level of debt capacity for tax-backed
debt issued by state and local governments. This means that for a given interest rate a
government can only borrow a limited amount before the risk of default would increase,
which would drive up the interest cost of the debt. The existence of multiple governments
that share the same tax base results in negative externalities as the amount of debt issued
by one government affects the interest costs of other governments’ debt since both are
backed by the same tax base. These negative externalities have consequences for local
governments in terms of the amount of debt they issue, the interest rate they pay on that
debt, and the timing of their debt issuance. There are also policy implications for regional
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planners considering adding new jurisdictions to existing areas, and coordination among
debt issuing governments.

Federalism and Fiscal Externalities
The subject of fiscal competition among governments is not new to the field of
economics, and it includes a variety of approaches resulting in various policy
implications. The literature can be broadly divided into studies of horizontal competition
and vertical competition. Horizontal competition focuses on intergovernmental
relationships between equal or similar levels of government while vertical competition
focuses on the hierarchical relationship between levels of government in a federalist
system. Horizontal fiscal externalities exist when a voluntary transaction between two
parties affects a third party. An example would be if one city set a property tax rate which
results in a neighboring city losing revenue.
Vertical externalities exist when a policy set at one level of government effects
lower or higher levels of government. One example would be if a state sets a sales tax
rate that then results in a city losing revenue. A subset of the fiscal competition literature
is concerned with governments that share a common tax base or that have overlapping tax
jurisdictions. Of this subset of overlapping jurisdictions in fiscal competition almost all
economic research has been concerned with the implications to tax policy, and the tax
rates of the overlapping jurisdictions. There has been little research on the amount of debt
issued by these governments or the interest rates of the resulting bonds.
The literature typically referred to as tax competition models the horizontal
externalities that arise from the interactions across the same level of governments, and is
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a subject that has been well covered (see Wilson 1999). The roots of tax competition can
be traced back to Oates' (1972). Most scholars consider Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)
as the first formal modeling effort of Oates' theory. Since its publication this model has
been criticized, revised, and extended but it remains a staple in the literature and is often
referred to as “the basic model of tax competition” (Wilson 1999; Edward and Keen
1996).
The basic model begins with assumption that governments maximize citizen
welfare and concludes that tax competition results in an under provision of public goods.
There have been many modifications, but perhaps the category of tax competition models
that provide the starkest contrasts are known as Leviathan models. Leviathan models start
with the assumption that governments are revenue maximizing and conclude that tax
competition places restrictions on governments which results in less governmental waste.
Both the underlying assumptions and technical components of these models are important
to understand how tax competition works.
In the lone model of tax competition that allows for government debt, Jensen and
Toma (1991) propose a game theoretic tax competition model where governments are
allowed to borrow, as well as tax, to finance government expenditures. They find strong
incentives for governments to issue debt as well as a more severe problem of underprovision of government services in the period when the debt is retired. While the general
tax competition literature also suffers from a lack of consideration of how horizontal
competition works with government debt, the focus of this review will be on vertical
externalities associated with debt.
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In a typology of government interactions Dahlby (1996) describes three basic
types of inter-jurisdictional fiscal externalities that occur when "a government’s tax and
expenditure decisions affect the well-being of taxpayers in other jurisdictions" (Dahlby
1996 398). This can happen through either directly changing prices or public good
provisions, or indirectly by altering tax revenues or expenditures of other governments.
The direct externalities affect the utility functions of non-residents whereas the indirect
externalities affect the budget constraints of other governments. These effects are always
horizontal between same level governments, whereas the indirect effects can be either
horizontal or vertical between different levels of governments. As Dahlby (1996) notes,
the externalities can be caused by either taxation or expenditures, and can be both
positive and negative. This finding highlights the ambiguous reaction effect throughout
the literature.
Where Dahlby (1996) describes externalities arising from tax or expenditure
decisions, it can be argued that another set of externalities arise from debt decisions. In
Dahlby's framework debt externalities would be classified as indirect because they alter
the revenues or expenditures of other governments. The major difference is that unlike
tax and expenditure indirect externalities, debt externalities are more likely to be
observed vertically because of the shared tax base. Vertical debt externalities may arise
when overlapping governments issue debt that leverages the same group of tax payers. If
debt is issued it is backed by the revenue from a group of tax payers. When another
government that shares that group of tax payer's issues additional tax payer backed debt,
that additional debt has a higher risk of default due to the fact that the first government
has already leveraged future tax revenue from those tax payers. The ability to issue debt
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backed by tax payer revenue results in a fiscal externality in that other governments face
higher risk when they issue debt, and that higher risk will be reflected in the interest
costs. Thus the ability to issue tax payer backed debt is akin to a common-pool resource.
In the economics literature fiscal externalities, and specifically the problem of
common-pool resources (CPR), are well known and often discussed. Common pool
resources are traditionally thought to be "sufficiently large natural or manmade resources
that it is costly (but not necessarily impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from
obtaining benefits from their use"(Gardner, Ostrom, Walker 1990). The concept of a CPR
has been since extended to include fiscal common-pool resources that maintain the
properties of rivalrous and non-excludable, but are applied to taxes and debt issues. In
these cases the benefits that go along with public spending are accrued to a particular
group, but that group does not bear the full costs associated with those benefits. The main
prediction of these models is that the disparity between costs and benefits leads to
overspending, and as the fiscal externalities increase (i.e. the number of overlapping
governments) spending increases. A natural extension of the fiscal common-pool
resource models is that if the number of local governments leads to increased spending, it
would also lead to increased levels of debt.

Vertical Fiscal Externalities
Compared to the research on horizontal tax competition the vertical externality
literature is sparse, but over the last fifteen years the number of both theoretical models
and empirical tests of vertical interactions between governments has grown substantially.
In his review of fiscal federalism literature Keen (1998) notes that the majority of
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federalism literature in economics focuses almost exclusively on the tax implications of
horizontal tax competition. In the basic models jurisdictions share a border in order to
model how mobile resources move between jurisdictions. The problem with this system
is that in reality there are many levels of governments with different borders which often
overlap one another. Keen (1998) frames the vertical fiscal federalism issue in terms of
concurrent taxation. He shows that common public economics issues such as optimal
taxation, redistribution through intergovernmental grants, and the allocation of tax
instruments across levels of governments can all be addressed through the framework of
vertical tax externalities.
The primary question of vertical externalities in a tax setting is: how does one
level of government's taxes change with another level of government's taxes? Flowers
(1988) and Johnson (1988) were the first to address issues of vertical externalities
associated with a shared tax base. Flowers (1988) concluded that in a federation with
Leviathan governments both federal and state level governments may end up on the
downward sloping portion of the Laffer curve indicating total taxation is too high.
Similarly, Johnson (1988) found that with benevolent government’s tax base overlap may
create incentives for state governments to redistribute income to their residents, because
the cost of the redistribution would be borne to all federal taxpayers and not just state
taxpayers. Both of these finding suggest vertical externalities result in over-taxation.
The theoretical framework of Flowers (1988) and Johnson (1988) has sparked a
small body of theoretical vertical externality literature. Similar to the horizontal tax
competition literature there is a split between those who model benevolent governments
and those who model leviathan governments. In the vertical tax externality literature the
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two camps are about equal in number of studies. Directly following Johnson several
studies published in the 1990's preferred benevolent governments in models of vertical
externalities and government redistribution. For example, Boadway and Keen (1996) and
Boadway et al. (1998) both modeled tax and expenditure decisions of benevolent
governments with wage income taxes, and concluded that tax rates will be too high if
state governments ignore the reduction in federal tax revenues that occurs when a state
increases a distortionary tax and shrinks the shared tax base.
One important result from the various models of vertical externalities is the
ambiguity of the reaction direction from responses to vertical externalities. For example,
Dahlby and Wilson (2003) show that an increase in the provision of a public good at the
state level can either increase or reduce federal tax revenues, which leads to either under
or over-provision of the state produced good. Their model assumes a tax on wage income
at both levels of government, and an inelastic labor supply. Wrede (1999) shows that the
Leviathans in a federation tax the fiscal common resource more extensively than the
single Leviathan in a unitary state. Wrede (2000) also finds that in a federation some
coordination may be optimal, and that the optimal level of coordination between levels of
governments depends on the degree of complementarity between public goods and tax
bases.
Despite the differences in modeling some overarching themes have stood out. For
example, vertical externalities are generally unaccounted for by governments and so they
result in over-taxation. Also, there is ambiguity in the direction of tax responses at the
different levels of governments. It is unclear whether state’s will raise or lower taxes in
response to a rise in federal tax rates, and how federal tax rates would respond to state
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changes. Some of this ambiguity seems to arise from the degree of elasticity in the taxed
good and the degree to which state and federally produced public goods are
complementary. To more fully explore the vertical externality mechanisms and how they
work it is important to consider the empirical tests of these theories.
Over the last ten years there have been a series of studies that have empirically
tested these theories, although the empirical literature has concentrated more on the tax
externalities than expenditure externalities. They have ranged in scope from the vertical
externalities that arise across OECD Countries (Goodspeed 2000) to those that arise
between municipalities and school districts (Wu and Hendrick 2009). The more wellknown articles have focused on commodity taxation (Devereux et al. 2007; Besley and
Rosen 1998; and Fredriksson and Mamon 2008), although several studies have
considered person income taxation (Goodspeed 2000; Esteller-More and Sole-Olle 2001),
business income taxation (Hayashi and Boadway 2001; Brett and Pinske 2000; and
Leprince et al. 2004), and local property taxation (Wu and Hendrick 2009). To test the
vertical externality theories reaction functions are estimated for the responses in one level
of government to the taxes of another level of government. The general consensus is that
vertical externalities do result in significant reaction functions, although there are mixed
results as to the sign of the reaction function.
Commodity taxes offer perhaps the most obvious test of vertical tax externalities
because both the federal and state governments in the United States often levy excise
taxes on the same commodities, and there has been a large amount of variation in the
rates. The literature has specifically focused on cigarette and gasoline taxation starting
with Besley and Rosen (1998). Besley and Rosen (1998) found that when the federal
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government increases taxes on either cigarettes or gasoline there is a significant positive
response in state taxes. For gasoline they found that a 10 cent per gallon increase in the
federal tax rate leads to a 3.2 cent increase in the state tax rate. In another study of
vertical externalities in cigarette taxation Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) find that a
federal tax increase may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues through both
a decline in the state tax base and through the decline of the state tax rate. They show that
states may reduce their tax rate on cigarettes by as much as forty-eight cents per dollar
increase in the federal tax rate. These two studies are in contrast to Devereux et al. (2007)
which suggests that with inelastic demand and low transportation costs federal taxes
would have little effect on state taxes, and that the tax rates of neighboring states plays a
more important role. Some of the differences in findings may be attributed to how
neighboring government tax rates are weighted, and the presence of cross boarder
shopping.
In addition to commodity taxes several studies using business taxes, income taxes,
and property taxes. The property tax studies are obviously more focused on local
governments, since property taxes are not typically levied at the federal level. In a recent
study Wu and Hendrick (2009) examined tax competition in Florida local governments
including school districts, municipalities, and counties. Their results show different
reactions to different levels of interactions, for example, the response of municipal
governments is negative to county property tax rate, but positive to school districts prop
tax rate. Overall there are significant vertical externalities between all three levels, but
different directions of tax reactions. Results show that a ten percent increase in the school
districts property tax rate results in a 1.7 and 4.6 percentage point increase in the
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municipal property tax rate depending on the model specification. However, the estimates
are negative and significant for the county property tax rate variable in all models. A ten
percent rise in county property tax rate leads to a 1.4 and 2.3 percentage point drop in the
municipal tax rate. These results give rise to interesting questions about how reactions to
vertical externalities may be different for a given set of hierarchical relationships.
Aside from empirical tests of tax externalities there have been a couple studies
that look at the horizontal and vertical externalities that arise from public expenditures.
Revelli (2001) set up a model of public spending determination within two levels of
English local governments. He finds the degree of vertical interaction to be significant,
and by increasing expenditures counties increase taxpayer burdens which reduces the
demand for district level services. Significant horizontal interactions are also found.
Overall higher and lower level local government services are found to be complements.
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) also develop a model of the demand relationship
between overlapping government activities for U.S. counties and cities. They find a
complementary relationship between the two government’s general service expenditures.
However, breaking down expenditures into specific categories they found no effect for
police and road expenditures. These findings suggest that while not all municipal and
county services are perfect compliments, on the whole increasing expenditures at the
county level will also increase spending at the municipal level. In the terminology of the
tax reaction literature these studies show a positive expenditure reaction for a lower level
government given an increase in expenditures by a higher level government.
In the last ten years the number of empirical tests for vertical interactions between
two governments that share tax base has grown to match the theoretical predictions

34

previous made. Table 2.1 summarizes these empirical tests for both tax and expenditure
reactions. As shown the studies have included the major tax types as well as various
levels of interaction. While the results are mixed, the trend seems to point to positive
reactions of lower level governments to increases in both taxes and expenditure increases
by higher level governments.
Table 2.1 Empirical Tests of Vertical Externalities
Authors (Year)
Besley and Rosen (1998 )
Fredriksson and Mamun
(2008)
Devereux et al. (2007)
Hayashi and Boadway (2001)
Leprince, Mades and Paty
(2004)
Brett and Pinske (2000)
Goodspeed (2000)
Esteller-More and Sole-Olle
(2002)
Esteller-More and Sole-Olle
(2001)
Wu and Hendrick (2009)
Revelli (2001)
Turnbull and Djoundourian
(1993)

Fiscal Type
commodity tax

Level of Interaction
federal - state

Reaction
positive

commodity tax
commodity tax
business tax

federal - state
federal - state
federal - province

positive
no reaction
negative

business tax
business tax
personal income
tax
personal income
tax
personal income
tax
property tax
expenditures

region - department
province - municipal

no reaction
mixed

federal - local

negative

federal - state

positive

federal - province
county-city-school
county-district

positive
mixed
positive

expenditures

county-city

positive

The obvious gap in the empirical literature mirrors the gap in its theoretical
counterpart, which is there has been no consideration of debt in the tests of vertical
externalities. The studies by Revelli (2001) and Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) fall
short the full analysis in their discussion of the tradeoff between taxes and expenditures
in overlapping governments. A natural extension should then be to consider how
government debt would be affected. If expenditures of a city increase with the increased
expenditures of a county these government services will either be paid for by an increase
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in taxes, as Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) point out, or they could be paid for by
government borrowing. The second option has not been considered in the existing
literature.

Theoretical Framework
To conceptualize the problem of fiscal externalities arising from debt in a
situation of overlapping jurisdictions it is helpful to think of a city government that shares
a tax base with a school district both of which are within the borders of a county or state
government. In this example when all three governments issue tax backed debt they are
pledging future incomes based on the same tax base. While it may be the case that
different levels of government tax different goods (property, incomes, sales, etc.) they are
still taxing the same geographic area and in most cases have the ability to levy additional
types of taxes to service the debt. In the debt management literature it is well known that
governments are concerned with "debt affordability" or "debt capacity," which is "the
level of debt and/or debt service relative to current revenues that an issuing entity could
support without creating undue budgetary constraints that might impair the ability of the
issuer to repay bond outstanding or make timely debt service payments" (Ramsey and
Hackbart 1996). The problem that arises is that the amount of debt issued by one level of
government may cause another level of government to pay a higher interest rate resulting
in a vertical as well as horizontal fiscal externality.
The subnational government interest rate literature has done a fairly
comprehensive job at explaining the factors that explain variance in interest costs.
Simonsen (2003) reviews some of these studies pointing to a number of studies that use
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OLS regression to predict true interest cost, which is the most compressive measure of
borrowing costs, with coefficient correlation between .7 and .96. The explanatory
variables are usually classified into two groups. The first are factors of the actual bond
issue such as the amount of the bond and the credit rating. The second set of factors are
economic or financial characteristics such as the government's current level of debt or
population. The vertical externalities created by overlapping jurisdictions may affect the
ability for governments to repay their debt, which could decrease their credit rating as
well as make the overall economic region's ability to repay more risky. This would affect
both sets of factors that are commonly associated with true interest costs.
The result of the externality is a common good problem akin to Hardin's (1968)
tragedy of the commons where each jurisdiction's marginal cost of accumulating debt is
less than the social marginal cost of that accumulation. Each jurisdiction issues debt to
increase their own utility or to maximize a representative citizen's utility, and they receive
the positive benefit from that debt. The problem is that the externality component reduces
the debt capacity and increases the interest rate shared by all the jurisdictions that share
that tax base. The effect on debt capacity can be considered in connection with the
findings of Trautman (1995) who found that states with decentralized management
structures have higher levels of outstanding debt than centralized states. Trautman’s
findings support the hypothesis that reduced oversight and institutional control leads to
increased levels of borrowing. If these findings are considered in the context of the
common-pool resource problem it seems that debt capacity would be affected by a
system of overlapping governments.
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To develop a theoretical model of these externalities a more simplified scenario is
needed. A hierarchical government system with multiple lower level jurisdictions, and
one higher level jurisdiction is considered. All jurisdictions levy taxes and issue debt to
finance a government service, and the interest paid on government debt is a function of
how much debt is borrowed. The following section formalizes this theory in a simplified
economic model based on fiscal competition models found in the literature.

Basic Model
A standard framework of a second-best world is considered to model debt in
fiscal competition with overlapping jurisdictions and vertical fiscal externalities. For
simplicity some assumptions need to be made. While these assumptions may not fully
capture the complexities of the government debt market, they are necessary to develop a
basic economic model.
It is assumed that there are N identical local government jurisdictions that have
the same objectives. As jurisdictions are identical this analysis focuses on the policies of
a single representative jurisdiction. Local governments are represented with lower case
letters and the state government is represented with upper case letters. All local
jurisdictions, and thus the representative jurisdiction, are assumed to be atomistic so that
they are price takers in the market for debt. The state government is assumed to be large
enough to affect the market, and that is taken into consideration when issuing debt. This
assumption may not hold in cases where one jurisdiction makes up the majority of a state,
but in cases of federal to state interactions and most state to local government interactions
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this is a reasonable assumption. While vertical debt externalities can also be shown
without this assumption, but they are more complex and do not add to the analysis.
It is also assumed that the deductibility of interest costs from taxes at a higher
level of government are ignored in this analysis. Relaxing this assumption would make
for an interesting extension of the model, but is not currently considered. In addition,
credit risk factors are assumed to be the same for all levels of governments and all
governments make their borrowing decisions simultaneously with perfect knowledge of
other government’s decisions. There is assumed to be a large number of identical
individuals acting as consumers, workers, and citizens. They are all born at the beginning
of period one and die in the second period in a two period finite-horizon case. In the
lower level government, and thus the state government there is one input, labor, used in
the production of a private good, c, and two public goods, g and G, both of which are
normal goods.
Each individual has the objective function:

  , ,  +

  , , 

(1)

Where c is private consumption, g is a public good produced by a lower level
government, G is a public good produced by the higher level government, and

is the

discount rate of future consumption. In this scenario public goods can be thought of as
infrastructure, which a common use of government debt. The utility function for a
representative individual,  is continuous, at least three times continuously

differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave where i is the time period. Both
governments produced goods, g and G, are financed through taxes and bonds. Both the
lower level governments issue bonds, b, and the higher level government issues bonds, B.
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Consumption in period 1,, is determined by income, , and a lump sum tax τ; whereas

consumption in period 2 is determined by income period 2,  . Debt is exogenously
supplied, but the interest rate is a function of the total demand for debt so that:
 +

 +

      

    1 +   1 + 
   + 

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Maximizing the representative resident’s utility produces a social welfare function.
,        ,  + ,  + 
+

(7)

   1 +   1 + ,  + ,  + 

Maximizing with respect to both taxes and debt a representative local government
chooses gives the first order condition
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(8)

(9)

From (8) and (9) the marginal rate of substitution between period 1 and period 2
consumption for the local government is determined. Once rearranged (12) shows the
marginal utility of consumption in period one equal to the discounted marginal utility of
consumption in period two times the interest rate. It can also be rearranged to show the
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marginal rate of substitution between period one and two is equal to the discounted
interest rate (13).

  


  1 +  + 


      

  1 +   





1 + 

(11)
(11)
(12)
(13)

Equation 14 represents the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in
period 1 and consumption in period 2 for all local jurisdictions within the state. Since
they do not consider their individual effect on the overall interest rate the tradeoff
between the two time periods is simply the discounted interest rate. The interest rate is a
function of total borrowing, and so each jurisdiction creates an externality when they
borrow that is does not factor into their social welfare optimization problem. The
externality that is created by local government borrowing can be seen in the state
optimization problem,
The state government would maximize the same social welfare function, only
they are proving a public good, G, to all local jurisdictions in the state. This means they
maximize the same social welfare function times N jurisdictions and choose the amount
of state bonds, B, and state taxes, T, that maximize social welfare across all jurisdictions.
, "  #     ,  + ,  + 
+

#   1 +   1 + ,  + ,  + 
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(14)
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(15)

(16)

Solving for the marginal rate of substitution the same analysis can also be done
for the state government by rearranging for (15) and (16) and solving for the marginal
rates of substitution. Because the state takes into account the effect state borrowing has
on the interest rate the last term illustrates the fiscal externality created by the local
jurisdictions and internalized by the state government. The term #   +  % can be
%&

interpreted as the total effect on interest rates created by multiple borrowing
governments, and will be positive in the state maximization problem where is was zero in
the local jurisdiction maximization problem. From the state perspective the social planner
considers the direct welfare implications for state borrowing, but also the impact state
borrowing has on local government budgets.
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(17)

(18)
(19)

(20)

(21)
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(22)

Since the term #   +  % > 0 the externality created by local borrowing is
%&

internalized by state borrowing, and the aggregated first period marginal rats of
substitution for the local and state government is not equal to the aggregated second
period marginal rates of substitution. The distortion causes the tradeoff between public
and private consumption between government levels and time periods to be different. It
should be noted that this interaction only exists if both governments issue debt, because if
not the first term in (20) is zero. If the externality is measured through the interest rate
paid on bonds these theoretical results can be used to make several empirical predictions.
This model serves as an example of the state and local debt externalities. While lemmas
are not proven from the model the results inform the following predictions.
Prediction 1: In overlapping jurisdictions that share a tax base increasing the total amount
of debt at one level of government will increase the interest costs paid on tax-backed debt
for other levels of government.
Using this basic model as a starting point several extensions can be considered.
For example, the model does not account for different types of lower government
jurisdictions. This would be a realistic problem where several types of overlapping local
governments shared a tax base under a central government. This situation could easily
arise in a metropolitan area where a county, city, school district, and municipal district all
share a tax base within a state. If this were the case, and the interest rate is maintained as
a function of the total demand for public debt it could be formalized as:
.

  ,  + - 
/

43

(24)

This would not directly affect the marginal rate of substitution for each of the
local governments, although from maximizing the social welfare function for all local
governments and for the state produces the following marginal rates of substitution:
)*
)* $
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(26)

This shows that as the number of jurisdictions increases there are more fiscal
externalities, which leads to a second empirical prediction. This prediction is also
consistent with the network theory of Complex Adaptive Supply (CAS). These
overlapping governments are an interconnected network of multiple entities in a selforganizing market that requires dynamic interactions among agents and their
environment. Therefore, adding additional entities to the network increases complexity
and makes self-organization more difficult (Pathak et al. 2007).
Prediction 2: As the total number of issuing jurisdictions increases the extent of
the externality will increase. Therefore, as the number of overlapping lower level
governments increases the interest costs paid on tax-backed debt will also increase.
There are many more extensions to this basic model that could account for more
realistic conditions. Future extensions could include a redistribution role for either
government through grants or other inter-governmental transfers. This simple model
holds taxes and expenditures constant to focus on the externalities related to debt, but a
more robust model may consider all three factors. While there are many theoretical and
empirical extensions it is important to have a foundation for understanding how debt
works in a model of fiscal externalities.
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Empirical Framework
From the theoretical section it is predicted that increasing the amount of lower
level government debt will increase the interest cost paid by higher level governments.
One of the complicating factors in this model is distinguishing the effect of the number of
overlapping governments from the effect of aggregate lower level debt (predictions 1 and
2). To address this issue empirically two separate models will be estimated. The first will
aggregate all sub-county local government debt to examine the effect of total lower level
debt on interest costs of a higher level government bond, and the second will examine the
effect of the number of debt issuing governments on the interest costs of a higher level
government bond. To correct for any downward bias in the standard errors Huber-White
standard errors will be used in an ordinary least squares regression.
These models will be tested on local government tax-exempt bonds. Local
governments include city, school district, municipal district, hospital district, community
college district, and special district debt. There are several advantages to studying the
relationship of overlapping jurisdictions with local level governments as opposed to the
relationship between federal and state governments. First, federal and state debt markets
may be significantly different because debt levels are a function of economic conditions
as well as cultural and political factors that fluctuate with electoral cycles (Clingermayer
and Wood 1995). Those differences are likely to be larger between federal and state
governments than between overlapping local governments. The research on local
government debt, especially in special districts, is less robust so this study adds to that
field as well.
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The dependent variable for this study is the interest cost paid by county
governments on tax-backed debt. While there are several methods for calculating
municipal interest rates the public finance literature has been fairly clear on the point that
true interest cost is the superior method (Robbins et al. 2001).The true interest cost (TIC)
is an overall interest rate indicating the performance of a bond. TIC is the most accurate
measure of the total cost of debt issuance, because it takes into account the time value of
money and is essentially an internal rate of return (IRR) calculation. This is superior to
the alternative, net interest cost (NIC), which is a more simplistic calculation of the
average value of the coupon rate.
True interest cost is the interest rate which equates the amount of dollars received
by the bond issuer with the present value of the flow of principal and interest payments of
the life of the issue so that,
4

 ,
/

1 + 2
1 + 23

(27)

Where  is the aggregate dollar amount received by the issuer, 5 is the number of

years to cash payments, 2 is the aggregate interest payment in period (assuming one
interest payment per year, and 1 is the annual principal in dollars repaid in period 5

(Denison 2012). The equation is solved recursively for TIC. This method is more
complicated than the NIC method because it accounts for the time value of money. Two
bids could have the same NIC but different TICs if one involves higher interest payments
in the early maturities of the issuer and lower interest payments in the alter maturities.
NIC produces a less complicated average annual cost of debt. NIC is calculated by first
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computing the total dollar cost of coupon payments over the life of the bond and then
dividing by the bond year dollars (Denison 2012).
There have been many studies that model TIC to answer a variety of questions
including the effect of multiple credit ratings (Hsueh and Kidwell 1988), competitiveonly laws (Peng and Brucato 2001), income tax differentials (Clarke and Bland 2003),
and jurisdiction size and sale type (Simonsen, Robbins, and Helgerson 2001). Some of
the key factors identified in these studies that influence TIC are the number and type of
credit enhancements including how many credit ratings are purchased, the type of sale,
the level of experience of the government issuing the bond, the tax-exempt status of the
state in which the bond is being issued, the size of the bond, and the size of the
jurisdiction.
To identify the impact of either aggregate lower level debt or the number of
issuing jurisdictions the models need to control for other variables that may influence true
interest cost. For these controls a fairly standard model of TIC derived from the literature
is used. These explanatory variables include total county expenditures, tax debt per
capita, a Bond Buyer 20-Bond GO Index, median income, population, par amount, years
to maturity, and dummy variables for credit rating categories.
The basic estimating equation for Model 1 takes the form:
6

7
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(28)

Where 6 7 is the true interest cost of a county, , bond issue, 5, in fiscal year, 6, 9 7

is the total amount of sub-county debt issued in county, , in fiscal year 6, ; 7 is a vector

of control variables that vary by county, = 7 is a vector of control variables that vary by
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issue, >7 controls for the fiscal year, and ? 7 is a random error term. The equation for
Model 2 takes the form:
67 
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Where the model is the same except instead of total amount of lower level debt

the number of issuing lower level governments is @ 7 . The log of both explanatory
variables of interest will be used because there are likely to be large values with

diminishing marginal impact. This requires counties with no overlapping jurisdiction
debt to be dropped.
Data and Results
The data used for this study consists of tax-exempt bonds issued by county
governments in the state of Texas between fiscal years 2005 and 2010. The data is
restricted to general obligation debt, which is different in risk and other characteristics
from revenue backed debt. The bond issue data were obtained from the Texas Bond
Review Board, an oversight agency that collects, analyzes, and reports information on
debt issued by state and local entities as well as approving state debt issues and lease
purchases greater than $250,000 or longer than five years maturity. Population estimates
for counties came from the Texas State Data Center. Median income estimates are from
U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. The Bond Buyer
Indices are from Bondbuyer.com.
The State of Texas has 254 counties, but not every county issues tax-exempt debt
in every year. Furthermore, some counties issues debt multiple times in the same year.
Out of the 254 counties 113 of them issue tax-exempt debt in this data set. In the 113 that
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do issue 64 of them only issued once meaning that the remaining 49 issued multiple
times. The top issuer, Travis County, home to the state capital Austin, issued 27 times.
The distribution by year also fluctuates with the lowest amount being issued in fiscal year
2009 at 59 issues, and the highest in 2008 at 95 issues. The other years fall between 64
and 84 issues each. The unbalanced nature of the panel will not complicate the analysis.
However, it may limit the generalizability of the study to all counties in all years.
Conclusions drawn from this analysis only apply to counties that issue debt and have
overlapping debt.
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the tax-exempt bond sales in Texas.
The unit of analysis is Texas Counties that issued tax backed debt between fiscal years
2005 and 2010. The average True Interest Cost (TIC) is just over 4%, and is fairly
symmetrical with only slight skewness. The main explanatory variable of interest,
amount of overlapping debt, averages $338 million issued by lower level governments
within the county. The median is significantly lower at $62 million showing a skewed
distribution.
The dependent variable for all models is the TIC of the bond. Model 1’s main
explanatory variable of interest is the amount of overlapping debt from lower level
governments. The amount of overlapping lower level debt was calculated by aggregating
the par value of all tax backed bonds in a fiscal year for local governments located within
a county. Local governments include cities, school districts, municipal utility districts,
health districts, community college districts, and other special districts. In cases where a
lower level government crossed multiple county lines that district’s debt was assigned to
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its primary service area county. Note that only counties with overlapping debt are
included, and the maximum amount of overlapping debt exceeded $3.3 billion.
The main explanatory variable of interest for (2) is the number of overlapping
sub-county governments. The number of overlapping governments figure was calculated
by adding up the total number of governments that issued debt within a county, as
opposed to the amount of debt that was issued. There was also a wide spread in the
number of overlapping governments ranging from zero to 173. The county with 173
overlapping governments is Harris County where the city of Houston is located.
The rest of the explanatory variables are categorized as either county variables,
issue variables, or market variables. County variables include the county expenditures,
debt per capita, income, and population. These variables are measured by the fiscal year.
Issue variables come from each bond that is issued by the county. Issue variables include
the par amount (amount of the bond), years to maturity, type of sale (competitive or not),
bond insurance, and credit rating if the issue was rated. Market variables are controls for
the tax-exempt bond market and include the visible supply for the next thirty days of taxexempt debt for the State of Texas and the BondBuyer.com Index of 20 general
obligation bonds. Visible supply projected for 30 days in the future for each issue while
the BondBuyer Index is weekly data.
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Description
Mean
True Interest Cost (TIC)
Internal rate of return on a bond
4.042
Log (Overlapping Lower
Log amount of tax-exempt debt that
18.2
Level Debt)
has been issued by all sub-county
governments in the same fiscal year
Log (Number of
Log number of sub-county
2.07
Overlapping Governments) governments that share a tax base
with the county and issued debt
Texas Visible Supply (in
Amount of debt available over the
1.5
billions)
next 30 days
Total Expenditures (in
Total County Expenditures for the
1.87
billions)
fiscal year
Tax Debt Per Capita (in
County Tax Debt per capita for the
4.52
hundreds)
fiscal year
Bond Buyer Index
A national index of municipal
4.53
bonds
Median Income
County median income for the
46,589
fiscal year
Population
County population for the fiscal
521,941
year
Log Par Amount (in
Amount the bond is being issued
15.7
millions)
for
Years to Maturity
Years to maturity for the bond
13.44
Competitive Sale
If the bond was competitively sold
0.11
Bond Insurance
If the bond had insurance
0.33
AAA
AAA rating by S&P
0.47
AA
AA rating by S&P
0.18
A
A rating by S&P
0.03
No Credit Rating
No rating by S&P
0.32

Std. Dev.
0.93
2.19

1.42

0.63
3.19
5.55
0.24
14,080
911,932
1.57
7.55
0.32
0.47
0.5
0.38
0.16
0.47

There is a large range in the 30 day visible supply suggesting that there are certain
times throughout the year when more debt is issued, although on average there is about
$1.5 billion worth of tax-exempt debt available. The average county has about $1.87
billion in expenditures and about $452 of debt per capita. These figures are most likely
driven by several large counties in Texas. This is further confirmed by the large range in
both population and median income. Very few of the issues are competitive sale,
meaning they are either issued by negotiated sale or private placement. The majority of
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rated issues receive AAA bond ratings from Standard and Poor’s, which is the highest
available. In the following model the category of receiving a BBB rating from standard
and poor’s is the left out category. It is also noteworthy that roughly a third of issues have
no bond rating.
The results for all three models are presented in Table 2.3. Column (1) reports the
results from estimating (28) where the main explanatory variable of interest is log par
overlap. Column (2) reports (29) results where the main explanatory variable of interest is
log number of overlapping governments. Model 3 is an instrumental variable model
corrected for endogeneity of log par overlap which may be endogenous if local
governments react to the county’s TIC. This is discussed below. Overall all three
perform well with a majority of the controls being statistically significant, and an R2’s of
roughly 45%. Both Model’s 1 and 2 are estimated with ordinary least squares and HuberWhite robust standard errors. The robust standard errors are used to correct for any
heteroscedasticity that may exist in the model. It should be noted that counties that had
no overlapping debt were dropped from the estimation. These observations are dropped
because as specified in the theory section no predictions can be made if there are no
overlapping jurisdictions that both issue debt.
It can be shown from the results in (1) in Table 2.3 that the total amount of debt
for lower level governments is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. This
suggests that on average increasing the amount of lower level overlapping debt will
increase true interest cost for county tax backed debt issues. Specifically, on average a
ten percent increase in the amount of overlapping lower level debt (10% increase is
approximately an increase the log of 0.10) is associated with a .0065 (0.1 times 0.065,
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from the Table 2.3), or 65 basis points, increase in the true interest cost of a county bond
issue, ceteris paribus. Considering the average TIC is 4.042% this can be an important
factor. For example, the average county has approximately $338 million worth of lower
level overlapping debt. If a city within an average county decided to issue a $34 million
bond, holding everything else constant, that county's TIC would increase from 4.04% to
4.05%, which over a thirty year bond would be a significant cost increase. The statistical
significance offers support for prediction 1, which hypothesized that increasing the
amount of debt issued by a lower level government would increase the interest costs of a
higher level government.
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Table 2.3 Estimation Results
(1)
VARIABLES
Log Par
Overlap
Log Num.
Overlapping
Log Par
Amount
30 Day
Visible
Supply
Total Exp
Tax Debt Per
Capita
BondBuyer
Index
Median
Income
Population
Years to
Maturity
Issue Comp
Sale
Issue
Insurance
AAA Rating
AA Rating
A Rating
No Rating
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Constant

Coefficient

(2)
(3)
Standard
Standard
Standard
Error
Coefficient
Error
Coefficient
Error

0.065**

(0.029)

-------

-------

0.071**

(0.030)

-------

-------

0.095**

(0.046)

-------

-------

-0.082

(0.055)

-0.076

(0.052)

-0.084**

(0.041)

0.130**
-0.079**

(0.057)
(0.035)

0.129**
-0.074**

(0.058)
(0.034)

0.130**
-0.081**

(0.059)
(0.036)

0.035***

(0.012)

0.032***

(0.012)

0.035***

(0.011)

0.482**

(0.199)

0.457**

(0.199)

0.483***

(0.179)

-10.283***
0.225**

(3.970)
(0.108)

-10.137*** (3.832)
0.202*
(0.109)

-10.569*** (3.571)
0.224*
(0.118)

0.077***

(0.011)

0.077***

(0.010)

0.077***

(0.006)

-0.276***

(0.070)

-0.264***

(0.070)

-0.276**

(0.114)

-0.173
-0.065
-0.322**
-0.567***
0.303**
0.311***
0.336***
0.036
0.025
-0.065
1.055

(0.145)
(0.169)
(0.149)
(0.214)
(0.125)
(0.104)
(0.108)
(0.098)
(0.171)
(0.160)
(1.199)

-0.148
-0.078
-0.325**
-0.561**
0.296**
0.300***
0.340***
0.063
0.027
-0.085
2.075*

(0.144)
(0.170)
(0.150)
(0.220)
(0.124)
(0.100)
(0.108)
(0.100)
(0.169)
(0.157)
(1.206)

-0.173
-0.067
-0.323
-0.563
0.304
0.314***
0.337***
0.039
0.030
-0.059
0.992

(0.142)
(0.668)
(0.665)
(0.688)
(0.660)
(0.119)
(0.117)
(0.120)
(0.156)
(0.140)
(1.207)

Observations 386
R-squared
0.451
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

386
0.448
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Several other variables were statistically significant for increasing TIC on average
including tax debt per capita, population, years to maturity, and not having a credit rating.
These results show that on average having higher debt per capita, having a larger
population, longer duration, and not receiving a credit rating all increase true interest
costs for counties. On the other side increasing total expenditures, higher median income,
competitive bond sales, and credit ratings A through AAA all decrease TIC on average.
These results are consistent with existing literature on municipal interest cost models.
The results of Model 2 are similar to Model 1. The positive coefficient on log
number of overlapping governments suggests that as the number of governments that
share a tax base with the county, and issue tax backed debt, increases the true interest cost
paid on county bond issues also increases. This provides evidence to support proposition
2 which hypothesized that as the total number of overlapping jurisdictions increased the
extent of the externality would increase, and in this case that externality can be observed
through higher interest costs. On average a 10% increase in the number of sub-county
governments that have overlapping tax bases with a county will increase that county's
TIC by 95 basis points, ceteris paribus. The average number of overlapping governments
is about 18, which means that on average if two addition jurisdictions are created within a
county that both issue debt that county's true interest cost would also increase from
4.04% to 4.05% (increase of 2/18 times 0.095). This means that both the layering of
governments and the stock of overlapping debt influences interest costs, based on the
arguments in the theory section that both matter.
Further specifications of these models have also been considered. For example, a
county fixed effects model was tested, but the fixed effect was found to not be
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statistically significant with a p value of approximately .319 and an F test value of 1.07.
The county fixed effect did account for approximately 56% of the variance in true interest
cost, but was not close to being statistically significant. Overall the explanatory variables
explained around 89% of the fixed effect. Furthermore, the county fixed effect was
positively associated with the logged par overlap variable. The correlation coefficient
between log par amount overlap and an estimated county fixed effect is 86.6%.
One possible objection to Model 1 with log par amount overlap as the explanatory
variable of interest is the presence of endogeneity. If par amount overlap is a measure of
the supply of tax-exempt debt, and it is regressed on true interest cost, which is a measure
of price, the argument can be made that the two are endogenous. To address this concern
the use of an instrumental variable is appropriate. Finding an instrument that is correlated
with the amount of total lower level debt of sub-county governments, but should not be
included in the original model of TIC is a difficult task. To solve this problem a rather
unorthodox instrument is constructed.
As stated previously, county fixed effects are not found to be statistically
significant in a model of TIC, and therefore not included in the original model. On the
other hand the estimated fixed effects are highly correlated with the amount of
overlapping lower government debt. The explanation for this set of results is that
historical county factors, such as the degree of fragmentation in that county, are reflected
in the county fixed effects. At the same time the market does not consider these historical
county factors when determining the interest rate of the bond. Economic conditions and
specific issue factors influence interest costs whereas fixed county characteristics do not.
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Since county is a geographic designation it is exogenous, and the county fixed effect
makes a valid instrument for log par amount overlap.
Statistically this satisfies the requirements of an instrument because estimated
county fixed effects do not appear in the original model, are correlated with log par
amount overlap, and are exogenous. Theoretically this addresses any questions of
endogeneity because county fixed effects can be historical in nature and will capture
elements like fragmentation of local governments. A county like Dallas County has
considerably more local governments within its borders compared to somewhere like
Bexar County because Dallas has historically allowed municipalities and special districts
to form easily. Bexar County, on the other hand, is home to the city of San Antonio,
which has historically annexed newly developed areas aggressively. Those counties with
more fragmentation, and thus more governments, are going to have more entities issuing
debt therefore they have more overlapping sub-county debt.
The results of an instrumental variable regression with county fixed effects with
the described specifications are listed as Model 3 in Table 2.3. When the county fixed
effect is used as an instrument for log par overlap it is still statistically significant, and
even has a slightly higher coefficient. The results of Model 3 as a whole look very similar
to Model 1 with only slight variations in significance and coefficient magnitudes.
Correcting for possible endogeneity on average when log par overlap is increased by 10%
true interest cost will increase by 70 basis points. Correcting for endogeneity also makes
the log par amount of the bond issue significant and negative so that on average as the
amount of bond issue increases the TIC decreases holding everything else constant. It
makes sense that larger bond issues would receive more favorable interest rates. The
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endogeneity correction eliminates significance of the credit rating variables, which is not
too surprising since credit ratings may be captured by the county fixed effects.

Discussion and Policy Implications
The results found in the last section are an extension of existing literature on tax
externalities to include debt externalities. The majority of vertical tax externality studies
focus on the tax reaction of a lower level government to the change in taxes from a higher
level government. This analysis focuses on the opposite direction, and aggregates many
different lower level governments rather than focusing on one, which makes the results
more difficult to compare to previous literature. Also, there is the obvious difference
between taxes and debt. While related, there is no direct comparison to be made between
a tax reaction and the response in interest costs.
Even with the difficulties in a direct comparison we do observe a positive reaction
at the higher level (county) interest rates in response to increased lower level aggregate
debt. Of the empirical studies on vertical tax externalities that found a statistically
significant reaction the majority of those findings were positive. In fact the only two that
were negative involved the interaction between a federal and local government. In the
studies of local governments both Revelli (2001) and Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993)
found positive reactions between county and district or county and city interactions. Even
Wu and Hendrick (2009) who found mixed reaction saw positive reactions between
municipal tax rates and the lower level school district tax rates. While the comparisons
are not direct there is some evidence that supports the findings for debt externalities being
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consistent with existing literature for tax externalities. In the sense that they can be
compared this leads to debt competition, the borrowing equivalent of tax competition.
As theorized the debt capacity of a region can be viewed as a fiscal common pool
resource. As lower level governments draw on that resource it diminishes the ability of
higher level governments to draw on that resource without paying higher costs. As local
governments compete over debt resources the institutional constraints, individual
government debt policies, and strategic interactions between governments become
increasingly important. With millions of dollars’ worth of interest payments at stake local
governments should be carefully observing the debt issuing policies of those
governments it shares a tax base with. Furthermore, these findings fit into a larger
discussion about centralized and decentralized debt policy at the state and local level. If
the problem is externalities created through fragmentation and allowing multiple
government borrowing power over the same taxing areas then one solution would be to
centralize the borrowing in that area.
One major policy implication for these findings is the effect of creating additional
governments which overlap an existing tax base. The results from the second model
show that on average adding an additional lower level government that issues debt will
increase the true interest cost. With multi-million dollar debt issuances this can add up to
economically significant amounts. These findings have implications for the fragmentation
literature as well as the centralization literature. Speaking only of the effect on debt costs,
it may be beneficial to limit the amount of special districts with borrowing power that
overlap traditional municipal governments such as cities and counties. Another policy
implication is that within coordination across debt issuing jurisdictions there can be debt
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competition interactions that increase costs. The increased costs may be avoided through
coordination efforts so that future generations are not burdened with higher debt service
payments.
This study extends the existing literature of vertical competition and fiscal
interactions across overlapping governments, and shows that there are many
opportunities to further explore in this line of research. Going forward it would be helpful
to look at multiple directions in the effect of externalities. For example, does county debt
affect school district interest costs in the same way? It would also be interesting to apply
the same theory at different levels of government to see if local debt affects State interest
costs. Finally, these effects have been analyzed in isolation so it would be helpful to see
how various tax rates change with both level of overlapping debt, number of overlapping
governments, and interest costs.

Conclusion
Governments makes fiscal choices based on the tradeoffs between taxation,
expenditures, and debt. Each of these fiscal choices has implications beyond the direct
impact to the government making the decision. The interaction between governments as
taxes and expenditure decisions are made has been explored both across similar
governments and between governmental hierarchies. The natural extension of this
literature is to consider debt as an alternative to taxes in financing government goods and
services, and the indirect effects that may result from those decisions.
This study lays out a basic conceptual framework and model to think about the
externalities that arise from overlapping governments that are issuing debt. The model
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predicts that interest costs will rise as the level of total amount of debt being issued in a
region rises. Results from three different models show that on average both the total
amount of lower level government debt that overlaps a county as well as the total number
of governments issuing that debt increases the true interest costs that a county pays on tax
backed bonds. These results have several policy implications for centralization and
fragmentation of governments, the creation of special districts with borrowing authority,
and the types of fiscal competition in which local government are involved. Given the
current importance of debt at all levels of government these are important considerations
for fiscal policy and interregional governance.
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Chapter 3
Local Government Risk Assessment:
The Effect of Government Type on Credit Rating Decisions

Introduction
Over the last twenty years state and local governments have been borrowing more
funds to finance infrastructure needs. An important component of determining the interest
costs of that debt has been credit ratings. Credit ratings are grades assigned by one of
three major agencies that convey information about the fiscal and economic health of a
government. These ratings are used as a source of information for evaluating the risk
associated with a debt instrument such as a municipal bond. The literature on
governmental credit ratings is vast, and addresses a variety of factors associated with risk
assessment. One factor that has not been fully considered has been the differences
between types of local governments, and the comparison of traditional municipalities
such as cities and counties to various special districts.
When governments issue debt they face a variety of decisions related to credit
ratings. They have to decide whether or not they want to be rated, how many ratings they
want, and who they want to purchase ratings from. While high credit ratings are shown to
lower interest costs an estimated twenty-five percent of local governments choose not to
be rated. Avoiding the ratings market represents a real option for some governments, but
the types of local governments that make this choice is unclear. Those who decide to
purchase a rating have a choice of three main stream options: Standard and Poor’s,
Moody’s, and Fitch. The decision to get rated by just one, a combination of any two, or
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all three is an interesting one that has not been fully explored especially in the context of
comparing different types of local governments.
As the amount of state and local debt has increased the make-up of local
government governance has also changed. Over the last twenty years the number of city
and county governments has grown slowly, the number of school districts has decreased,
and the number of special districts has increased greatly (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System). Special district governments are an interesting group because
they are usually created for specific purposes, are given limited taxing powers, and
usually have the ability to issue general obligation debt. Debt issued by special districts
has been a main driver in the growth of total local government debt. While the literature
on special districts is somewhat limited it has been shown that they operate differently
than traditional municipalities (Ostrom, et al. 1961). The differences in risk assessment
by different types of local governments have implications for understanding the complete
local government debt picture.

The Role of Credit Ratings
Credit ratings have been found to influence borrowing costs in several empirical
studies, yet the credit rating decision process of local governments not fully understood.
Local governments are responsible for paying for their own credit ratings, and some
chose not to go through the expensive process. Generally a high credit rating is
considered necessary to get the best interest rate, because credit ratings provide signals of
risk quality to the market and reduce uncertainty. This allows local governments from
around the country to have access to investors that may not be familiar with that
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particular government’s financial health. With increased access to debt markets
government’s tax-exempt bonds can be sold faster and with lower interest rates. The
function of the credit rating can be divided into three categories: as a source of
information, as an evaluator of risk, and as a determinate of interest costs (Ziebell and
Rivers 1992; Rivers and Herring 1986).
It is commonly assumed that credit ratings represent a source of information about
the financial, economic, and administrative environment of the entity being rated.
Historically it has been found that investors do not always have access to financial and
economic information on cities (Morse and Deely 1983; Jovanovic 1982). And while this
access may have been somewhat mitigated by electronic resources that were not available
at the time of these studies it is still reasonable to assume that either there is a lack of
transparency with municipal financial data (Reck and Wilson 2006), or the information
presented is not easily understood (Copeland and Ingram 1982, Davidson et al. 1977). In
either case information asymmetry exists between issuers and investors. In an effort to
close the gap in information credit ratings are a signal to the market with additional
information for investors. In addition to condensing and synthesizing the information,
rating agencies also claim to have access to additional information not privy to the public
(Pottier and Sommer 1999).
The information provided by rating agencies may be used in a variety of ways,
but the primary use is in the evaluation of risk. At the most basic level ratings are used to
designated bonds that are “investment grade,” that is a bond that has a rating of at least a
BBB for Standard and Poor’s and Fitch or Baa for Moody’s. Some institutional investors
have regulations that prohibit the investment is bonds that are not investment grade.
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Beyond the investment grade distinction each letter grade is subdivided into
subcategories. For example, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch have a plus minus system
(AA+, AA, AA-), and Moody’s adds a 1, 2, or 3 to ratings (Aa1, Aa2, Aa3). The
subcategories denote relative strength and weakness within each rating category. These
signals can be used to differentiate the risk associated with relative ratings.
The additional information and the evaluation of risk that come from credit
ratings plays an important role in determining the interest cost of government bonds. In
an efficient market governments with higher credit ratings will pay lower interest costs,
because they are less risky investments. Lower credit ratings signal to investors increased
risk of ability to repay debt so investors will demand higher interest costs as
compensation for greater risk. Credit ratings have been a standard factor in models of
interest cost over the last thirty years (Bland 1980; Bland and Chen 1990; Robins and
Simonsen 1996, 1999, 2001). Debt service payments are of the upmost importance in
government budgets because without debt service access to credit markets is severely
restricted. Given the importance of debt service government have a strong incentive to
obtain the lowest interest rates possible, thus they have incentives to obtain high credit
ratings.

The Decision to be Rated
Credit ratings close information asymmetries which allow investors to more
readily evaluate risk, and ultimately determine interest costs. An interesting question
becomes why some governments choose not to purchase any ratings when selling bonds.
There may be several possible reasons why governments may not purchase credit ratings
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despite their ability to close information asymmetries. For example, if the financial or
economic situation of a government is extremely poor there may be no advantage to
closing information gaps and allowing investors a chance to completely evaluate the risk
(Reeve and Herring 1986). The government may not be hiding their risk, but simply there
would be no benefit from purchasing a rating. In this case the assumption is that only the
lowest quality governments chose to be nonrated. This perspective has gained some
support from several findings that suggest nonrated bonds have on average higher interest
costs (Jantscher 1970; Bensen 1979).
The perspective that nonrated bonds are of uniformly lower quality than rated
bonds is challenged by Reeve and Herring (1986) who argue that nonrated bonds are
either self-selected or are the result of rational cost/benefit analysis from the inherent
riskiness of an issue. Their results indicate that nonrated bonds are systematically
different from rated issues. They find that unrated bonds are smaller, have shorter
average maturity, issued by smaller governments, and have fewer bids from underwriters
compared to rated bonds. Moon and Stotsky (1993a) in a model correcting for sample
selection bias also find that volume of debt, geographic location, and city size are
significant determents of the decision to obtain a rating. Reeve and Herring (1986) find a
market distinction between small nonrated bonds and large nonrated bonds. Smaller (less
than one million par value) nonrated bonds were found to be priced 10 basis points lower
than the lowest invest grade class, while large nonrated bonds were priced an average of
30 basis point higher than the lowest investment grade class. This finding suggests that
lower governments may be better off not purchasing rating.
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Similarly, Ziebell and Rivers (1992) studied the various characteristics associated
with non-rated securities and found that smaller cities have a lower probability of being
rated than large cities. They also find that small non-rated cities vary greatly across
several economic, financial, and demographic characteristics, and that specific variables
can be used to distinguish between cities that seek ratings and those that do not including
geographic region indicators. The results of this study show that nonrated issues should
have quality characteristics similar to investment grade issues, and that the decision to
purchase a rating for small cities is related to their per capita incomes, densities, and rates
of population growth. There was no evidence to suggest that rated and nonrated cities of
similar sizes were statistically different in financial, economic, or demographic
characteristics.
While there have only been a handful of studies that examine the factors that
determine a government’s choice to obtain a credit rating there is surprising consensus.
All three studies found that the size of issue as well and the size of the government are
both important determinates in the decision to obtain a rating. Reeve and Herring (1986)
as well as Ziebell and Rivers (1992) posit that smaller governments conduct a costbenefit analysis, and determine that the savings from a potential decrease in interest cost
does not outweigh the price of a credit rating.
Aside from the choice to be rated governments also choose how many total
ratings to purchase. Choosing the number of credit ratings is a decision that has received
less attention in the academic literature. While there are studies that look at whether a
private firm purchases an optional third rating (Pottier and Sommer 1999; Jewell and
Livingston 2002) there is an absence of studies that model the number of government
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ratings including the possibility of not purchasing a rating. Hsueh and Kidwell (1988)
test the impact of a second credit rating on the issue borrowing cost of a municipality.
Specifically they looked at two different scenarios. The first is if a municipality acquires
a second rating that is at the same level, and the second is if they acquire a second rating
that is a different level. They found that in cases where the ratings were the same
category interest costs were lower, and in cases where the second rating was more
favorable than the first the interest costs were lower than interest costs associated with the
less favorable rating. Their findings suggest that two credit ratings provides additional
information, and that split ratings where the second rating is more favorable results in
reduced borrowing costs. While this finding is useful, it does not look at the specific
determinants of purchasing an additional rating, and those determinant’s marginal effects.

Picking a Rating Agency
Once a government decides to obtain a rating they have to decide how many
ratings they want, and which agencies they should get ratings from. There are three major
rating agencies: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings. They often assign the
same rating to a given government, but there are cases of split ratings where the same
government is given different ratings by different agencies. All three agencies assign a
letter grade from a series starting with the highest grade of AAA (Moody’s) or Aaa
(Standard and Poor’s and Fitch) and end with C (Moody’s) or D (Standard and Poor’s
and Fitch). To answer the question why a government would choose to be rated by one
agency over another it is necessary to consider the differences in how agencies assign
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ratings. One of the primary ways these differences have been explored in the literature is
through split ratings.
According to Ederington (1986) there are three explanations for split ratings. The
agencies could have different standards in how they assign ratings and what constitutes a
given grade, they could have different evaluation methods or assign different weights to
certain factors, or the differences could be completely random. In a comparison between
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s Ederington finds no evidence of differences in
standards or evaluation methods, and concludes that the difference represent random
differences of opinion on issues who creditworthiness close to the borderline between
ratings.
Alternatively, Moon and Stotsky (1993b) develop a system of equations to model
the determinants of a municipality’s rating for Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s using
smoothed maximum likelihood estimation. They formally test the differences between
the two agencies and find that self-selection is important in Moody’s ratings while not in
Standard and Poor’s ratings. Contrary to Ederington’s (1986) study they find that split
ratings reflect differences in both the weight attached to specific determinants of ratings
as well as differences in the way the bonds are classified. These contrasting findings can
be attributed to several important differences in both data and methods. The first is that
Ederington’s sample consisted of industrial bonds, while Moon and Stotsky’s study used
cities. The second difference is the sophistication in methods used in each study.
Ederington used a relatively simple ordered probit, while Moon and Stotsky use smooth
simulated maximum likelihood estimation in a system of equations.
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In a slightly different third study Cantor and Packer (1997) examine firms that
purchase a third optional rating after the automatic rating from Moody’s and Standard
and Poor’s, and test whether differences in credit ratings for a particular firm reflect
different rating scales or result from sample selection. They find that the third agency,
usually Fitch, assigned a higher average rating which was not from selection bias, but
rather from differences in rating scales. They then look at why firms choose to obtain
additional ratings and find that firms are more likely to obtain a third rating if they are
large and experienced issues in the capital market.
There have several empirical studies that model the factors that attribute to credit
ratings for different agencies, although the majority of these studies are for industrial
bonds of firms rather than governments. Pottier and Sommer (1999) identify factors
influencing the decision of insurance firms to obtain a rating or multiple ratings, the
determinants of ratings for three agencies, and reasons for differences across agencies.
They find that higher leverage is associated with greater uncertainty, and thus a lower
rating. This finding is consistent with Cantor and Packer’s (1997) findings. They find
that firms with higher growth have a lower probability of getting a rating, and that larger
firms tend to have higher ratings. They also find that rating agencies differ
systematically in weighting various factors. Moody’s appears to use a much smaller
number of publicly available quantitative factors in its rating process, and may rely on
more private or qualitative information. The cutoff points between ratings (AAA, AA,
etc.) are not statistically different.
In a comparison of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings to Fitch Jewell and
Livingston (2002) compare the rating levels, rating changes, and relative impact of bond
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yields of industrial firms. Their results show that firms with publicly available Fitch
ratings have high ratings from Moody’s and S&P than firms without Fitch ratings. Firms
that release a Fitch rating on average have a lower yield, a more stable rating, and are
more likely to receive an upgrade. They find evidence that 85% of the difference in the
mean rating when a firm has all three ratings is caused by selection bias. This is in
contrast to the Pottier and Sommer (1999) study that found no evidence of selection bias.
This difference could be attributed to the type of firm that is being studied. Pottier and
Sommer (1999) were using insurance companies, while Jewell and Livingston (2002)
were using industrial bonds.
In a test of the different determinants of Moody’s and S&P ratings for
municipalities Moon and Stotsky (1993) find that self-selection is found to be important
in Moody’s ratings while not in those of S&P. They find that split ratings appear to
reflect differences in both the weight attached to certain determinants and differences in
the way bonds are classified. This is slightly different from the Pottier and Sommer
(1999) findings that suggest no differences in classification or cutoff points. This is also
contrasted with Ederington (1986) who found no systematic differences between the
rating agencies in their ratings of industrial bonds. These finds could be driven by a less
restrictive smooth simulated maximum likelihood estimation used by Moon and Stotsky
(1993).
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Theoretical Framework
The underlying theoretical motivation in the literature on credit ratings is the
theory of financial intermediation. The principal role of credit rating agencies is the
reduction of ex ante uncertainty or informational asymmetry about the probability of
financial distress (Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Millon and Thakir 1985; Pottier and
Sommer 1999). So that the greater uncertainty about the risk of an issuer the greater the
incentive and value of credit rating. A credit rating represents an outside opinion of the
fiscal health of an organization, which decreases the uncertainty and decreases the
information asymmetry between issuer and purchaser. This relationship implies that
factors that lead to higher levels of uncertainty will increase the likelihood of purchasing
one or more credit ratings.
While every government that issues a bond has some inherent uncertainty there
has been little research on the differences in the amount of uncertainty associated with
different types of local governments. In fact there has been little research on the credit
rating or risk assessment of non-municipality local governments. An exception is
Denison et al. (2007) considers the effect of management performance on credit ratings
of school districts. While they include school districts under the heading of
“municipality” there is little discussion of the commonality between school districts and
the cities or counties that have been previous subjects of analysis.
While the particular levels of uncertainty associated with different types of local
government is somewhat ambiguous there are several reasons to believe that there will be
differences. Traditionally municipalities such as cities and counties have been used to
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study credit risk in local governments. These municipalities are contrasted with a myriad
of special-purpose governments including school districts, water districts, community
college districts, hospital districts, and many others. These different types have various
revenue streams and infrastructure needs. In general, because cities and counties have
access to a wider range of revenue streams they have more flexibility to adjust to market
conditions and therefore have less uncertainty. Comparing traditional municipalities to
special-purpose governments it is expected that special-purpose governments will have
higher uncertainty, and therefore will have higher demand for credit ratings.
Government size has been recognized in the literature as a driving indicator in the
decision to be rated, but type of government could also be an important factor. If a costbenefit analysis is the reason for not purchasing a rating there are several factors
associated with size that may produce the same rating decision. For example, the
resources available to the government as well as the scope of the projects that are to be
funded will both differ with government size. Different types of local governments will
have a variety of revenue sources, and thus available resources, as well as a variety of
projects that need to be funded. Certain special districts are created for purposes that
require large infrastructure investments such as hospitals for health districts or sewer
systems for water districts. These types of districts may be large in population, but small
in scope.
By modeling the effect of various types of local governments on credit rating
decisions this study adds depth the government size explanation in the literature. Several
facets of the rating decision are to be modeled including: the selection of a credit rating
agency, the probability of being unrated, and the decision of how many ratings to
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purchase. While there are several interesting explanatory variables in these models the
one that has yet to be fully identified in the literature are the differences between types of
local governments namely counties, cities, school districts, and a variety of special
districts. This study aims to both describe the credit rating choices made by local
governments and estimate the impact various factors have on both the agency choice and
the number of ratings choice.

Empirical Framework
In modeling the choice of credit rating agencies there are several econometric
issues that have to be addressed. For example, the decision to be rated by all three
agencies will be related. That decision can be related in two ways. The first is that the
error terms are not independent, and the second is that the decisions are recursively
determined. To address the covarying error term scenario the following equations are
estimated:
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type of government, type of bond sale, type of bond (GO or Revenue), bond insurance,
bond amount, total tax rates, years to maturity, population, and cost of bond issue. In the
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above set of equations the error vectors (C- , C4 , CD  are assumed to be identically and
independently distributed with the following trivariate normal distribution:
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From this set up the likelihood functions can be derived and maximized using
simulation-based estimation methods developed by McFadden (1989) and Pakes and
Pollard(1989) (Moon and Stotsky 1993). A simulation method is used in a maximum
likelihood estimation of the multivariate probit regression (Greene 2003, 931-933;
Cappellari and Jenkins 2003). This technique evaluates a multivariate normal
distribution using the GHK smooth recursive conditioning simulator. The GHK simulator
has several nice properties including “the simulated probabilities are unbiased, they are
bounded within the (0,1) interval, and the simulator is continuous and differentiable
function of the model’s parameters” (Cappellari and Jenkins 2003).
The simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator is also consistent as the number
of draws and the number of observations goes to infinity. This means the SML estimator
properties are asymptotic as long as the sample size increases with the number of
estimating equations. Simulation bias can be reduced by increasing the number of draws
as the sample size increases. To ensure the number of draws is sufficient it should exceed
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the square root of the sample size (Hajivassiliou and Ruud 1994, 2416–2419). Following
this guideline the following estimations will use one hundred draws.
The second scenario in which the decisions to be rated are related is that
jurisdictions decide which agencies to get rated by through a recursive process. Rather
than making independent decisions they go through a series of decisions for each agency.
For example, a city would decide to be rated by S&P, given that decision they decide to
be rated by Moody’s, and finally decide to be rated by Fitch. To set up a recursive
process some assumptions have to be made as to the sequence of agency ratings. The
following recursive process is based on the number of total ratings that are being given
by each agency. In a sample of Texas bonds Standard and Poor’s rate the most (6,820),
Moody’s rates the second most (4,471), and Fitch the least (1,703). Therefore I set up the
following set of recursive equations:
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In this system a jurisdiction decides to be rated by Standard and Poor’s then
decides to be rated by Moody’s factoring in the decision to be rated by Standard and
Poor’s, and finally decides to be rated by Fitch considering the decision to be rated by the
first two. While this is one possible set of systems it seems to be the most likely scenario
if the decisions are directly related. The error terms of the recursive equations are also
joint normal, and are estimated using the same multivariate probit technique.
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Data
The credit rating selection process will be modeled for each local government bond
issue assuming that each government has the choice to purchase a rating from Standard
and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. The dependent variable for each agency equation will be
whether or not the Texas local government was rated by that particular agency. The main
explanatory variables are dummy variables that specify the type of local governments.
Government types include: city, school district, community college district, water district,
and other special district (hereby referred to special districts). The reference category is
county government. There are also a series of control variables including dummy’s for
revenue bond or lease purchase bond (the reference category is general obligation), debt
outstanding, negotiated or competitive sale (the reference category is privately placed),
bond insurance, a total tax rate, population, year to maturity on the bond issue, the
assessed property value of the district in the previous tax year, a dummy variable for
whether the district is in a metropolitan statistical area, a dummy if the district borders
overlap multiple counties, and a figure of general cost of issuance.
The control variables are chosen from previous studies, and are designed to capture
the factors associated with choosing a rating. Reeve and Herring (1986) found that
average maturity, government size, and underwriter competition mattered for unrated
bonds. Moon and Stotsky (1993a) found that volume of debt, geographic location, and
city size are significant factors. While Ziebell and Rivers (1992) found that while smaller
governments have a lower probability of being rated they varied on economic, financial,
and demographic characteristics. These sources of variation are controlled for in the all
the following models.
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The data used for this study consists of bond issues in the state of Texas between
fiscal years 2000 and 2010. The bond issue data were obtained from the Texas Bond
Review Board, an oversight agency which collects, analyzes, and reports information on
debt issued by state and local entities as well as approves state debt issues and lease
purchases greater than $250,000 or longer than five years. In total there are 10,899 bond
issues, but because of missing data for tax rates and assessed values 1,661 observations
are dropped leaving a sample size of 9,238. The majority of the governments issuing
bonds are cities, school districts, and water districts.
Table 3.1 shows a cross-tabulation of the type of government and rating agency.
While this table over counts the number of bond issues because governments can be rated
by multiple agencies it gives an overview of the percentage frequency distributions. As
shown there are trends in the rating agency choice by type of government. Cities,
counties, and community college districts tend to be rated by S&P and Moody’s whereas
health districts have a larger relative proportion that are not rated. School districts are
rated more frequently by Fitch, and other special districts by Moody’s. A chi square test
shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between rating agency and type
of local government (α=.005).
Table 3.1 Rating Agency Crosstab
City

SP (%)
Moody’s
(%)
Fitch (%)
Not
Rated
(%)
N

County

Community
College
District
37.27% 39.48% 41.20%
30.03% 31.89% 38.58%

24.18% 21.50% 33.47% 54.84% 6,874
22.88% 42.06% 9.35% 18.21% 4,498

13.12% 13.26% 9.74%

12.42% 17.76% 50.35% 3.17%

19.59% 15.37% 10.49%

40.52% 18.69% 6.83%

23.79% 2,736

6,381

153

3,317

1,041

267

Health
District
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Special
District

107

School
District

5,976

Water
District

N

1,734

The percentage cross tab for type of local government and the number of credit
ratings is shown in Table 3.1. The majority of cities, counties, community college
districts, and other special districts purchase two ratings, while the majority of school
districts and water districts only purchase one rating. Health districts stand out because
the over half of them do not purchase any credit ratings. From Table 3.1 it can be seen
that the majority of the bonds with ratings from all three agencies are municipalities
rather than special purpose governments.

Table 3.2 Number of Rating Crosstabs

Number
of
Ratings

0
1
2
3
N

City

County

Type of Government
Community Health Special
College

31.79%
19.27%
35.35%
13.59%
3,960

25.76%
20.61%
38.33%
15.30%
621

17.95%
20.51%
51.92%
9.62%
156

53.39%
21.19%
20.34%
5.08%
118

22.73%
18.18%
47.73%
11.36%
88

School

Water

N

13.73%
43.57%
38.45%
4.25%
3,009

26.91%
60.88%
10.28%
1.93%
2,947

2,736
4,069
3,245
849

The descriptive statistics for the continuous control variables population, debt
outstanding, assessed property value, and years to maturity by number of ratings are in
Appendix A. While the majority of local governments are rated at least once about 25%
of local government bonds that are not rated. In general the nonrated governments are
smaller, have lower amounts of debt outstanding, and have a lower assessed property
value. Of those governments that were rated 4,047 (37%) were only rated once, 3,242
(30%) were rated twice, and 821 (7.8%) were rated three times. On average governments
with more credit ratings also have higher average populations, debt outstanding, and
assessed property values.
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The descriptive statistics broken down by type of government are in Appendix B.
Some interesting results from looking at the explanatory variables by type of government
include the amount of debt outstanding for other special districts, which has an average of
$306 million. The rest of the local government types average between $14 and $40
million. Also, the community college districts have the largest average assessed property
value although the highest single government assessed value is a special district. The
average time to maturity is relatively similar across types of government, which suggest
that that they are issuing similar amounts of short and long term debt.

Results
Table 3.3 presents the empirical results from the trivariate probit model estimation,
which estimates equations 1, 2, and 3. These equations estimate the effect of local
government type on the propensity of receiving a rating from each rating agency. The
control variables for type of bond (GO, LP, Revenue), type of sale (negotiated sale and
competitive sale), bond insurance, population, debt outstanding, overlapping districts,
issuing cost, and being in an MSA all increase the propensity to be rated by all three
agencies. On average the control variables have less statistical significance in predicting a
Fitch rating. The total tax rate is an interesting result because it is negative for both S&P
and Moody’s, but is positive for Fitch. Conversely the assessed property value is only
statistically significant for the Fitch rating, and as property value increases the propensity
of a Fitch rating decreases.
Overall there is a statistically significant relationship between type of local
government and rating agency selection. The reference category for each rating selection
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equation is the county government, which means that in the S&P equation being a city
increases the propensity to be rated by S&P, while being a community college district,
health district, and special district lowers the propensity for a S&P rating. In the Moody’s
equation being a community college district, health district, special district, and water
district all lower the propensity to be rated by Moody’s when compared with a county
government. Also, the negative coefficients on special district and water district in the
Moody’s equation are at least five times are large as the other coefficients. The Fitch
equation results for cities and community college districts are similar to S&P, but the
coefficient on health district is positive while the coefficients on school and water
districts are negative and statistically significant.
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Table 3.3 Multivariate Probit Results
Variables

S&P

Moody’s

Fitch

City

0.243***
(0.0857)
-0.588***
(0.177)
-0.733***
(0.263)
-0.627**
(0.317)
-0.140
(0.111)
-0.0858
(0.0966)
-0.0167
(0.0708)
-0.356*
(0.205)
2.110***
(0.0616)
1.907***
(0.0668)
0.761***
(0.0407)
-0.199**
(0.0828)
0.761***
(0.266)
0.00107
(0.00232)
2.510***
(0.661)
0.00546
(0.00385)

0.0427
(0.0755)
-0.348**
(0.152)
-0.274
(0.242)
-1.502***
(0.362)
0.128
(0.105)
-1.526***
(0.0881)
0.147**
(0.0602)
-1.204***
(0.263)
1.531***
(0.0618)
1.835***
(0.0677)
0.546***
(0.0404)
-0.583***
(0.0846)
0.563***
(0.187)
-0.000304
(0.00214)
2.381***
(0.464)
-0.000391
(0.00276)

0.277***
(0.0849)
-0.760***
(0.172)
0.490*
(0.282)
-0.0276
(0.335)
-0.434***
(0.136)
-1.565***
(0.135)
0.203***
(0.0637)
-0.355
(0.246)
1.630***
(0.0957)
1.161***
(0.103)
-0.0184
(0.0501)
0.677***
(0.121)
2.376***
(0.210)
0.00430*
(0.00257)
1.079***
(0.403)
-0.0234***
(0.00312)

General Issuing

0.581***
(0.190)

0.101
(0.186)

0.385*
(0.233)

Overlaps

0.273**
(0.112)

0.447***
(0.0958)

0.114
(0.105)

MSA

0.187***
(0.0436)
-1.969***
(0.108)

0.511***
(0.0418)
-1.787***
(0.102)

Community
Health District
Special District
School District
Water District
Revenue Bond
Lease Purchase
Negotiated Sale
Comp Sale
Bond Insurance
Total Tax Rate
Population
Years to
Debt
Assessed Value

Constant

Observations
9238
9238
Standard errors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

S&PMoody’s
Rho

S&PFitch
Rho

Moody’sFitch Rho

0.590***
(0.0579)
-3.553***
(0.145)

-0.727***
(0.0255)

-0.0471*
(0.0279)

-0.239***
(0.0264)

9238

9238

9238

9238
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We can also interpret the rho value between each pair of rating agencies to analyze
the covariation of the unmeasured characteristics in each model. The rho values for both
the S&P-Moody’s pair and the Moody’s-Fitch pair are statistically significant and
negative. This means that the unmeasured information is having a negative impact on
purchasing a Moody’s rating compared with S&P and Fitch. The results for rho provide
evidence that there are opposing factors in the choice to be rated by S&P and Moody’s,
and similarly for Moody’s and Fitch. This suggests that S&P and Moody’s ratings are
substitutes as opposed to compliments, which is a divergence from the literature (Hsueh
and Kidwell 1988; Moon and Stotsky 1993).
There are also interesting results for the control variables. Local governments are
more likely to be rated by S&P if they are issuing more traditional general obligation or
revenue bonds when compared to a lease-purchase bond. Similarly they are more likely
to be rated by S&P if they are issuing negotiated or competitively sold bonds as opposed
to privately placed bonds. Positive coefficients on population and debt outstanding for
S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch suggest that as local governments get larger and have more
debt they are more likely to be rated by all three agencies. Also they are more likely to be
rated by all three if the local government is in a designated metropolitan statistical area.
Interestingly if the local government geographic boarders crossover multiple county lines
they are also more likely to be rated by S&P and Moody’s than Fitch. In Texas this
overlapping jurisdiction finding is most likely to apply to water districts.
The marginal probabilities of success for each equation can also be computed from
the estimated equations. Figure 3.1 is a graph of the average marginal probability of
success for each agency by type of local government. In this case “success” implies the
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purchase of a rating. This shows that most government types have the highest probability
of being rated by S&P, and the lowest probability of being rated by Fitch. The exception
being health districts which have a higher probability of being rated by Moody’s. As
shown the marginal probabilities vary by type of government. Cities, counties, and school
districts look relatively similar while water districts have almost no probability of being
rated by Fitch. Special districts have almost the same probability of being rated by
Moody’s and Fitch. It is important to keep in mind that these are averages, and they
control for the various other variables in the model.

Figure 3.1 Average Marginal Probabilty of Success
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Since 25% of all local government bonds are unrated an equally interesting question
is what the marginal probability of not being rated for each government type. The
marginal probability of not being rated is the same as the joint probability of all three
rating agency equations being equal to zero. Solving for UAF  0, ∀ W, where W 

*&U, ((YA  G, #Y Z56ℎ is the marginal probability of not purchasing a rating. The

same can be done for the joint probability of receiving a rating from all three agencies.
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Figure 3.2 is a graph of the average joint probabilities of no rating or being rated by all
three agencies. As shown cities actually have the highest probability of not being rated,
despite health districts having a higher frequency of no rating. On average health districts
have the highest probability of being rated by all three agencies. In general the average
probability of not being rated is higher than the average probability of being rated by all
three agencies. The average probability of not being rated for all types of governments is
22% while the average probability of being rated by all three agencies is only 12%.

Figure 3.2 Average Joint Probability of No
Rating or Rated by All Agencies
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The results for the multivariate probit with simultaneous equations are shown in
Table 3.2 (only type of government coefficients shown). In this specification the decision
to purchase subsequent ratings depends on which agency the jurisdiction was rated by
previously. This process is solved recursively with S&P being chosen first, Moody’s
second, and Fitch third. In general the results from this estimation look similar to the
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previous results, although there is more statistical significance. The coefficient for S&P
rated in the Moody’s equation and Moody’s rated in the Fitch equation are both negative.
This offers further support that the Moody’s rating is a substitute for S&P and Fitch
rating.
There are also a few differences in the coefficients on the local government types. For
example, being a health district now decreases the propensity to be rated by Moody’s.
The same is true for school districts and water districts in the S&P equation. The
coefficient sign does not change for any of the variables, but there is more statistical
significance. The sign and significance also stays the same for the rho values on the S&PMoody’s rho and the Moody’s-Fitch rho, although the coefficient decreases on both.
Interestingly the S&P-Fitch rho is also negative and statistically significant in this
estimation. It is insignificant and positive in the first model. The full model results in are
Appendix C.
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Table 3.4 Recursive Multivariate Probit Results
VARIABLES

S&P

S&P Rated

Moody’s

Fitch

-1.146***
(0.0947)

Community
College
District
Health District
Special
District
School District
Water District
Constant

S&PFitch Rho

Moody’sFitch
Rho

0.201**
(0.0880)
-0.605***

0.0812
(0.0795)
-0.498***

0.00307
(0.110)
-0.266***
(0.101)
0.294***
(0.0857)
-0.791***

(0.181)
-0.847***
(0.268)
-0.647**

(0.162)
-0.538**
(0.258)
-1.942***

(0.175)
0.486*
(0.285)
-0.165

(0.324)

(0.379)

(0.344)

-0.225**
(0.113)
-0.200**
(0.0985)
-2.524***
(0.220)

0.0996
(0.112)
-1.857***
(0.0962)
-3.412***
(0.282)

-0.418***
(0.138)
-1.700***
(0.149)
-4.040***
(0.285)

-0.146***
(0.0451)

-0.0984*
(0.0528)

-0.0921*
(0.0553)

9,238

9,238

9,238

9,238

9,238

Moody's Rated
City

S&PMoody’s
Rho

Observations
9,238
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Number of Ratings
The decision to be rated by each of the three rating agencies is inherently connected
to the decision to purchase multiple ratings. Estimating the effects of various factors on
the decision to purchase additional ratings requires a different model. The number of
ratings that are purchased for each bond issue is a count variable, and there are several
methods that can be used to estimate count variables. A negative binomial regression is
used in this case because there may be over dispersion, every government has the same
exposure time, and there are not an excessive number of bonds with no rating (Lawless
1987). A poisson model was also tested and similar results were found.
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In this regression the dependent variable is the number of credit rating each local
government received. The explanatory variables are the same as the rating decision
equation. The incident rate ratios (IRR) and the coefficients of the negative binomial
regression are presented in Table 3.5. The IRR transformation is used for interpretation.
From the IRRs it can be shown that being a city increase the expected number of
ratings by 10% compared to a county, whereas community college districts get rated
about 20% less often. Special districts and water districts both get rated about 40-45%
less often than counties on average. Compared to a lease purchase being a general
obligation bond increases the expected number of ratings by 63% whereas being a
revenue bond increases the expected number of ratings by 70%. Both negotiated and
competitively sold bonds increase the expected number of credit ratings by about 1200%
compared to privately placed bonds. Purchasing bond insurance increases the expected
number of ratings by about 30%, and being in a MSA increases the expected number of
ratings by 40%. Also, local governments that overlap multiple counties also increase the
expected number of ratings by 12%. Each additional million dollars in issuing costs is
associated with an estimated 30% increase in the number of rating, while each additional
million people (population) are associated with a 60% increase. Surprisingly the amount
of debt outstanding does not affect the number of credit ratings.
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Table 3.5 Negative Binomial Regression for Number of Ratings
Variable
City
Community College District
Health District
School District
Special District
Water District
General Obligation
Revenue
Negotiated Sale
Competitive Sale
Bond Insurance
Total Tax Rate
Population
Years to Maturity
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
General Issuing Cost
Overlaps Multiple Counties
MSA
Constant
Observations
Ln(α)
Likelihood ratio test α =0
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1

IRR
1.104**
(0.0474)
0.794***
(0.0647)
0.860
(0.116)
1.017
(0.0650)
0.595**
(0.129)
0.541***
(0.0278)
1.633***
(0.249)
1.709***
(0.265)
12.51***
(0.962)
12.05***
(0.945)
1.331***
(0.0344)
0.879**
(0.0472)
1.625***
(0.149)
1.001
(0.00132)
1.000
(0.000129)
1.000***
(1.36e-06)
1.298***
(0.116)
1.120**
(0.0571)
1.385***
(0.0397)
0.0493***
(0.00849)
9,238
-44.34
Chibar=0

Coefficient
0.0991**
(0.0429)
-0.231***
(0.0815)
-0.151
(0.135)
0.0169
(0.0640)
-0.519**
(0.217)
-0.614***
(0.0514)
0.491***
(0.152)
0.536***
(0.155)
2.527***
(0.0769)
2.489***
(0.0784)
0.286***
(0.0259)
-0.129**
(0.0537)
0.485***
(0.0916)
0.000633
(0.00132)
9.95e-05
(0.000129)
-3.58e-06***
(1.36e-06)
0.261***
(0.0896)
0.113**
(0.0510)
0.326***
(0.0286)
-3.009***
(0.172)

From these results it can be shown that all local governments are not equal when it
comes to credit ratings. The type of local government matters in both the choice of which
rating agency to select, and how many ratings to purchase. In the decision of which
agency to be rated by local governments have the choice of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch. Of
those the majority of cities choose to be rated by S&P (37%) and Moody’s (30%).
Holding all other variables constant on average being a city increases the propensity of
being rated by S&P and Fitch compared with counties. Cities are also 10% more likely to
purchase an additional rating than counties.
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While city and county credit rating agency choice have both been studied in previous
literature, the inclusion of multiple special purpose governments adds a new dimension to
the study of credit rating decisions. Four types of special purpose governments are
explicitly modeled with a fifth category of other special districts. In the decision to be
rated by each of the three agencies the special purpose governments act similarly in that
they have lower propensities to be rated. What differs between them is the magnitude of
the difference. For example, water and special districts have significantly lower
propensities to be rated by Moody’s (Figure 3.1 and 3.2). Looking across all of the results
an interesting pattern emerges. School district rating decisions are closely related to both
city and county decisions. This can be seen in the frequency distributions of rating
agencies, the coefficients on ratings by each agency, and the probabilities of not being
rated. These results suggest that school district decision making may be closer to
municipalities than other special districts.
By looking at the frequency distributions for each type of special purpose government
the differences in agency preference can be seen. The majority of community college
districts are rated by S&P, the majority of school districts are rated by Fitch, the majority
of special districts are rated by Moody’s, and the majority of health districts are not rated
at all (Table 3.1). There is less variability in the number of ratings by type of government
since the majority of municipalities and community college districts purchase two ratings,
the majority of school and special districts purchase one rating, and the half of health
districts go unrated.
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Conclusion
Debt financing is an important tool in local government finance. As local
governments of all types turn to debt financing the factors that attribute to their interest
costs and access to financial markets are important issues. Credit ratings are one option
that local governments can use to reach markets they would not usually have access to,
and to receive lower interest rates by purchasing signals of credit worthiness from
independent agencies. Local governments have several decisions to make in the credit
rating process. First they have to decide whether or not to purchase a rating. If they do
enter the credit rating market they have to choose which agency to purchase a rating
from, and how many ratings to purchase. The process of making these choices may be
systematically different depending on the type of local government that is making them.
Several patterns emerge from both the frequency tables and the statistical analysis of
the decision to be rated by a credit rating agency. The first is that cities and counties are
similar in their decision making process. Cities have a higher propensity to be rated by
S&P and Fitch, but the average marginal probabilities of being rated by each agency are
approximately equal. Also, the percentage frequencies of the amount of cities and
counties that are rated by each agency are similar. Cities are about 10% more likely to
receive an additional rating on average, but in terms of the percentage frequency of
number of ratings municipalities are similar.
Perhaps more surprising is that school districts also behave similarly to traditional
municipalities. The percentage frequencies tell a story of differences, but once all the
control factors are considered the decision to be rated by each agency is similar to both
cities and counties. Aside from school districts having a lower propensity of being rated
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of being rated by Fitch they are not statistically different from counties in rating agency
decision. The biggest difference between municipalities and school districts is that on
average school districts have a lower probability of being unrated. This could be a result
of school districts needing access to credit markets more than cities and counties. Over
70% of school districts are negotiated sale bonds, which is contrasted with 14.5% of
bonds competitively sold. The type of sale suggests either lower access to competitive
markets, or a preference for negotiated sales.
The rest of the special districts include community college districts, health districts,
water districts, and other special districts. These districts types are different from
municipalities, but they are also different from each other. There are differences in terms
of both the agencies that they are likely to purchase ratings from, their average
probabilities of not being rated, and in the number of credit ratings they are likely to
purchase. One of the interesting variables that may be attributing to these differences is
the assessed property values. Property values would be directly related to the district’s
ability to raise revenues since the property tax is a major tax source for special districts in
Texas. Other interesting factors that may affect the decision of who to be rated by, and
how many ratings to purchase are population, overlapping multiple counties, issuing
costs, and being in an MSA. The amount of debt outstanding affects which agency the
districts choose, but doesn’t have an effect on the number of ratings.
Often in the literature and popular media special purpose governments are lumped
together into one group. These findings suggest that the label “special districts” may be
too vague, at least when describing issues of debt financing. These special purpose
governments are different in how they choose to access credit markets, and those
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differences may be important in determining both the total amount of debt that is issued,
and the interest costs paid on that debt. Going forward it may be prudent to consider
school districts closer to municipalities, and distinguish other special purpose
governments as completely separate entities.
Pervious literature on local government credit rating decision making has been
limited to municipalities. From these previous studies it was found that government size
as an important factor in predicting an unrated bond. The hypothesis is that for smaller
governments the costs of purchasing rating would exceed the benefits from that rating.
By exploring the differences in local governments while controlling for population and
assessed property value the effect of government type on credit rating decisions can be
seen. The results are varied showing that special purpose governments cannot be
grouped together when describing credit rating decisions. While government size does
matter, the probability of not being rated is generally higher for municipalities than other
special districts. Several other factors increase the probability of not being rated
including being a privately placed bond (compared to competitive or negotiated sale) and
a lease-payment bond (compared to general obligation and revenue bonds). It should be
noted that the generalizability of these findings to non-Texas governments is unknown,
because there may be differences in rating agency markets shares by state that could
affect these findings.
From a policy maker perspective these difference can be important when assigning
functions to different levels of governments. For example, in the decision to provide
water that task can be given to a municipality (city or county), or a separate government
can be set up to handle only water distribution (water district). There are likely to be
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different borrowing costs associated with these two options, and those borrowing costs
will be determined in part by the credit rating agency and the number of ratings. From
this analysis we can see that water districts are most likely to be rated by Standard and
Poor’s and about 60% of all water districts purchase one rating, although there is about a
20% chance that they go unrated. These decisions will all result in various borrowing
costs, and ultimately different interest payments.

Copyright © Robert A. Greer 2013
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Chapter 4
Semiparametric Estimation of Municipal Interest Cost:
Average Derivative Estimation
Introduction
The sale of bonds is an important tool for state and local governments, and has
seen an increased role in government finance over the last ten years. For example, in
2011 there was about $315 billion worth of new state and local government securities
issued, which is approximately twice the number of new security issues in 2001 (Federal
Reserve Board of Governors). These funds are used in a range on projects, but are
generally used to fund infrastructure needs. Given the frequency of this financing method
it is apparent that the interest costs governments pay on debt is an important point in
public finance. The repayment of debt is important for governments to maintain strong
credit ratings, and thus access to credit markets. Debt service payments are an important
expenditure for most governments, and to predict future debt service payments an
accurate estimate of the interest rate is needed.
Starting with Sorensen (1979) and continuing through current literature modeling
municipal interest cost has been of increasing importance. Unfortunately the techniques
and methods used in this modeling have not changed. The standard ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression has been the go-to method for most social scientists, and so it is no
surprise it has been the method of choice in public finance. OLS is a popular method
within the parametric class of estimations, meaning it assumes a specific probability
distribution to make inferences about estimated parameters. Parametric statistics is
contrasted with nonparametric statistics, which assumes either no particular probability
95

distribution or no functional structure of the relationship between variables. In between
lays semiparametric techniques which contain components both classes of methods.
The advantages of nonparametric and semiparametric methods are that they can
estimate parameters without imposing unnecessary assumptions about the distribution of
variables, or their relationships. In terms of public economics and policy analysis this is
particularly useful because it allows for the estimation of marginal impacts of explanatory
variables with minimal assumptions. One specific semiparametric method developed by
Stoker (1992) is average derivative estimation (ADE). ADE allows us to estimate the
average marginal impact that each explanatory variable has on a dependent variable
without assuming the structure of the relationship. This is contrasted with OLS
regression, which assumes that the explanatory variables are linear in their parameters.
This study reviews the theory and application of ADE, and applies ADE to the estimation
of municipal interest costs, and compares the results to a standard OLS model. We find
differences in the statistical significance of explanatory variables, but when ADE is
assumed to be a single index model the relationship is fairly linear which offers support
to the standard model of true interest costs.

Municipal Interest Cost
There are several methods for calculating municipal interest rates, but the public
finance literature has come to the consensus that true interest cost is the superior method
(Robbins, Simonsen, and Jump 2001).The true interest cost (TIC) is an overall interest
rate indicating the performance of a bond. TIC is the most accurate measure of the total
cost of debt issuance, because it takes into account the time value of money and is
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essentially an internal rate of return (IRR) calculation. This is superior to the alternative,
net interest cost (NIC), which is a more simplistic calculation of the average value of the
coupon rate.
There have been many studies that model TIC to answer a variety of questions
including the effect of multiple credit ratings (Hsueh and Kidwell 1988), competitiveonly laws (Peng and Brucato 2001), income tax differentials (Clarke and Bland 2003),
and jurisdiction size and sale type (Simonsen, Robbins, and Helgerson 2001). There are
signifiacnt factors identified in these studies that influence TIC such as: the number and
type of credit enhancements, the type of sale, the level of experience of the government
issuing the bond, the tax exempt status of the state in which the bond is being issued, the
size of the bond, and the size of the jurisdiction. All these factors are included in our
models.
Multiple regressions are the most common method used in the estimation of TIC.
In general the factors that influence municipal bond interest rates can be classified into
two categories: market factors and issue characteristics (Simonsen 2003). Market
characteristics include factors like current market rates or economic conditions. Issue
characteristics include specifics of the bond structure such as the type of sale, various
credit ratings of the bond, whether or not the bond has insurance, and total amount of
debt borrowed (par amount). As Simonsen (2003) points out the R2 of these models are
generally good and can explain up to 96% of the variance in TIC (Simonsen and Robbins
1999).
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A potential concern with these studies is that they all utilize a simple ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression, or semi-log OLS model in their estimation. This means
that typical models are shown to have a high R2 based on the non-trivial assumption that
the relationship between the explanatory variables and the true interest cost is linear.
Theoretically there is no reason in the literature to assume a linear relationship between
the variables, in fact there is no theoretical work to suggest any functional form of the
relationship. The basic question at hand is how various factors explanatory factors affect
true interest cost. Specifically public administrators and policy analysts would like to
know the marginal impacts of each explanatory variable. The purpose of this paper is to
estimate a model in which no functional form is assumed, and no prior assumptions about
the distribution of the data is assumed. To this end several non-parametric and semiparametric techniques are available. To use the least amount of restrictions on the model,
and ask only the effect explanatory variables have on true interest cost average derivative
estimation is an appropriate estimation option.

Average Derivative Estimation
Average derivative estimation (ADE) was originally developed by Hardle and
Stoker (1989), Powell, Stock and Stoker (1989), and Stoker (1992) as a semiparametric
estimation technique to provide an alternative method for determining the correct
functional form without presupposing unnecessary assumptions on the model. ADE is a
particularly useful technique for policy analysis because it allows marginal impacts to be
directly estimated. As Stoker (1992) argues semiparametric methods are “designed to
permit estimation of parametric and auxiliary functions simultaneously, without specific
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assumptions on the forms of the unknown functions” (Stoker 1992, 5). Being able to
evaluate the marginal impact of policies without unjustified assumptions is of
considerable importance for economists and policy analysis.
While the theory of ADE is well developed the application of ADE in empirical
literature is somewhat limited. Originally ADE was applied in the estimation of various
factors that affect automobile collisions (Hardle and Stoker 1989; Stoker 1992). Lee,
Kwak, and List (2000) also utilized ADE in the estimation of hedonic pricing models and
found the results consistent with theoretical predictions suggesting it is a viable
alternative to traditional models. Huang and Fu (1999) used ADE to estimate a
semiparametric stochastic frontier regression. They then applied the technique to data on
farmers’ credit unions in Taiwan to find that banking services exhibit economies of scale,
and there is a high degree of cost inefficiency in their operation. Finally, Deaton and Ng
(1998) compared ADE to OLS in a study of tax reform and food prices in Pakastan.
While they recognize that “ADE is attractive in principle, because it directly estimates the
statistics required for policy analysis,” they find that each method has its own strengths
and weaknesses (Deaton and Ng 1998, 900). In each of these studies ADE is used
because the authors wanted an estimation technique that was free of assumptions about
the form or distribution of the data.
As stated above ADE requires few assumptions, but it is not completely

assumption free. First we assume that x] affects y] and is either exogenous or

predetermined. We assume x] is continuous and first differentiable with some probability
density function fx, which is also first differentiable. We denote the mean regression of
y on x as mx  Ey|x so that,
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We also define l] :
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Where δ is the average derivative. While it is not strictly necessary, we can then impose a
single index condition on the ADE so that:
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Where K· is the kernel function and h is the bandwidth parameter.
We use the Epanechnikov kernel which has been proved to be optimal for
minimum variance (Epanechnikov 1969). An Epanechnikov is a standard kernel that
spreads points quadratically as opposed to a normal distribution or other such shapes (see
Silverman (1986) for further discussion of kernels). The choice of kernel is independent
and does not influence regression results. The bandwidth is chosen using likelihood
cross-validation (LCV). In LCV the kernel density estimates are assumed to be

asymptotically normally distributed, 0 ~@ ,  . Then the likelihood function is
maximized with respect to the bandwidth h, so that:

101

.

1
 , 8#0 
#

11

0/

LCV is based on minimizing the Kullback-Leibler distance, which is the distance
between a true underlying distribution and the estimated distribution (Silverman 1986;
Horne and Garton 2006). Using LCV in picking a bandwidth is an extension of using a
likelihood to “judge the adequacy of fit of a statistical model. It is of general
applicability, not just in density estimation” (Silverman 1986, 52).
As an example, the kernel density estimate is graphed for the dependent variable
TIC below. It can be seen from this that the true interest cost from our sample of Texas
bonds is not normally distributed. While the kernel density itself is not important for
ADE, the assumption of an existing probability distribution is needed.
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Figure 4.1 Kernel Density Estimate of TIC

As discussed in Hardle and Stocker (1989) and Lee et al. (2000) ADE is root-n
consistent and asymptotically normal, which makes it theoretically comparable to other
more traditional parametric estimators. Given these properties a standard t-test can be
used to compute statistical significance with the average derivative estimates, and their
corresponding-covariance matrices. The comparability of ADE to more traditional
models provides an excellent opportunity to compare parametric and semiparametric
estimates of the same parameters to test assumptions about functional form. This study
makes this comparison between a typical OLS regression common in the municipal
interest rate literature and ADE.
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Model and Data
To examine the differences that may arise between a parametric and
semiparametric estimation a standard model of TIC consistent with the literature is
considered. Two separate models will be estimated. The first is a typical OLS regression
where the dependent variable is TIC and the explanatory variables are a standard mix of
market factors and issue factors. The second model is an ADE model that is set up with
the same dependent and explanatory variables. Because of the root-n consistency the
resulting coefficients and t-statistics will be directly comparable. Although not required
by ADE we also assume a single index for the purpose of graphically depicting the
transformation function gx]' β.
The explanatory variables are fairly standard from the literature and are recognized as
such in Simonsen, Robbins, and Helgerson (2001) as well as Simonsen (2003). Credit
ratings are usually classified as A, AA, or AAA by either Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s,
or Fitch credit rating agencies and then treated as a series of dummy variables. There are
several problems with this classification technique. For example, if treated as a series of
dummy variables it is not possible to find the average derivatives of these variables. An
alternative to dummy variables is to create an index of risk associated with a bond issue.
Indicators such as ordinal credit ratings, bond insurance, and type of sale are all variables
that assess the risk to investors. These variables can be factor analyzed to create indices
that serve as continuous risk variables. These new variables are equivalent to propensity
scores of risk.
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Factor Analysis is a standard technique in psychometrics that has also been
successfully applied in economics and policy analysis. One of the main uses of factor
analysis is to identify common factors associated with a set of dependent variables that
are all measuring some latent variable. For example, credit ratings by Standard and
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch are all indicators of the credit risk associated with a particular
government or bond. So in this case credit risk would be the latent variables, and the
credit ratings from each agency would be the indicators. All three ratings are attempting
to measure the same thing, and so they have a common factor. In addition to the credit
ratings indicators such as whether the bond was sold as a competitive bid or a negotiated
sale or whether the bond is insured are also measures of credit risk. All these indicators
can be factor analyzed to estimate the common factors. In econometrics this common
factor is perfectly equivalent to a random effect.
Finally, two variables are included that are not typically modeled. One is the total
visible supply of municipal debt at the closing date of the issue (Denison 2001).
Municipal bonds are required by law to be announced thirty days before sale. Since all
the bond sales in the dataset are tax exempt basic supply theory suggests that as the
supply of tax exempt debt increases price of that debt will decrease. The second new
variable is a measure of existing debt per capita. Debt per capita will be directly related to
the risk associated with a government, and thus the price they pay on future debt. While
we may not be the first to consider these factors, they are not standard in all models of
TIC. Listed below are the explanatory variables and their descriptions:
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•

30 Day Visible Supply – Amount of total tax exempt debt that is scheduled to be
available in the thirty days after issue date. Includes city, school district, and
special district debt.

•

Total County Expenditures – Total amount of county expenditures for the fiscal
year

•

Tax Debt Per Capita – Amount of tax backed debt per capita for county
residents

•

Bond Index – A Bond Buyer 20-Bond GO Index for the week the bond was sold

•

Income – Median Income estimate for the county

•

Population – Population estimate for the county

•

Par Amount - The size of the bond in dollars

•

Maturity – Number of years until final bond maturity

•

Common Factor 1 – Low Credit Risk Factor

•

Common Factor 2 – Medium Credit Risk Factor

•

Common Factor 3 – High Credit Risk Factor

The data used for this study consists of tax exempt bonds issued by county
governments in the state of Texas between fiscal years 2005 and 2010. For comparability
we restricted the data to only general obligation debt. The bond issue data were obtained
from the Texas Bond Review Board, an oversight agency which collects, analyzes, and
reports information on debt issued by state and local entities as well as approves state
debt issues and lease purchases greater than $250,000 or longer than five years.
Population estimates for counties came from the Texas State Data Center. Median
Income estimates are from U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty
Estimates. The Bond Buyer Indices are from Bondbuyer.com.

106

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Skewness

True Interest Cost
30 Day Visible
Supply (in millions)
Total Expenditures
(in millions)
Tax Debt Per
Capita
Bond Buyer Index
Median Income
Population
Par Amount (in
millions)
Years to Maturity
Competitive Sale
Bond Insurance
AAA
AA
A
No Credit Rating
Risk Factor 1 - Low
Risk Factor 2 - Med
Risk Factor 3 -High

0.0404
1,540.00

0.0408
1,410

0.009
669

0.0132
202

0.0847
4,150

0.4144
0.717

1,870.00

369

3,190.00

2.3

14,800

2.249

452.61

314.54

555.82

0

5,318.71

4.97

4.53
46,588.79
521,941
19.6

4.51
45,315
121,889
7.5

0.24
14,080.28
911,932.10
33

3.94
17,843
845
0.14

5.85
81,875
4,092,459
322

1.206
0.499
2.73
4.132

13.44
0.11
0.33
0.47
0.18
0.03
0.32
0
0
0

14.5
0
0
0
0
0
0
-0.71
-0.15
-0.09

7.55
0.32
0.47
0.5
0.38
0.16
0.47
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1.25
-1.01
-0.64

39
1
1
1
1
1
1
1.12
1.96
9.28

57.02
2.448
0.714
0.126
1.665
5.95
0.756
0.08
1.03
5.76

Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for 461 tax exempt bond sales. The
average TIC is 4.04%, and is fairly symmetrical with only slight skewness. There is a
large range in the 30 Day Visible Supply suggesting that there certain times throughout
the year when more debt is issued, although on average there is about $1,540 million
worth of tax exempt debt available. The average county has about $1,870 million in
expenditures and about $452 of debt per capita, although both of these figures are skewed
so that the medians are considerably lower. These figures are most likely driven by
several large counties in Texas. This is further confirmed by the large range in both
population and median income. As shown the amount being borrowed also has a large
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range and is skewed suggesting a few counties borrowing very large amounts. Very few
of the issues are competitive sale, meaning they are either issued by negotiated sale or
private placement. The majority of rated issues receive a AAA bond rating, which is the
highest available. Although it is noteworthy that roughly a third of issues chose not to get
any bond rating.

Estimation and Results
As indicated in the previous section the series of dummy variables associated with
credit risk can all be factor analyzed to create continuous propensity score variables of
risk. Table 4.2 presents the factor loadings for credit risk. As shown factor 1 is positively
associated with the higher credit ratings, and negative for the lower ratings. Factor 2 is
positively associated with more mid-range risk. And factor 3 is associated with higher
risk. An interesting point is that the factor analysis indicates that bonds with no credit
ratings are roughly equivalent to those with AA ratings. This empirically supports
findings by Reeve and Herring (1986) who theorize that governments who do not
purchase credit ratings would be equivalent to a AA ratings, but are usually too small to
justify the cost of getting a credit rating.
Table 4.2 Credit Risk Factor Loadings
Variable
Factor1 Factor2 Factor3
AAA Credit Rating
0.993 -0.124 -0.044
Bond Insurance
0.716 -0.092 -0.061
competitive sale
0.161
0.100
0.146
AA Credit Rating
-0.341
0.904 -0.255
no credit score
-0.746 -0.663 -0.086
A Credit Rating
-0.094
0.133
0.878
BBB Credit Rating
-0.011
0.071
0.433

108

To test if the factors are reliable and consistent we calculate Cronbach’s alpha for
each relationship. The alpha between Factor 1 and AAA credit score, insured bonds, and
competitive sales, which are all indicators of the lowest risk, is .77. The alpha between
Factor 2 and AA credit score and no credit score, which are the medium risk group, is
.768. These are both fairly high and consistent with desired values for applied
psychometrics (Peterson 1994). The alpha between Factor 3 and A is lower at .4295, and
while below the typical alpha values it is strongest relationship for the lowest quality
ratings.
To estimate the marginal impacts of the variables listed in the previous section on
TIC two models are estimated. The first is a traditional linear OLS regression with
Huber-White standard errors, and the second is a semiparametric average derivative
estimation. From previous studies we expect the logged par amount, median income,
population, and factors of low risk to lower TIC; whereas years to maturity and factors
associated with higher risk will increase TIC. Theory suggests that 30 day visible supply,
total expenditures, and tax debt per capita should all should increase TIC. The results
from the model run with the dummy variables are presented in Appendix D and the
results from the OLS model run with the common factors are presented in Table 4.3. As
shown all the variables maintain almost the same significance and the direction of the
coefficients does not change. This insures that nothing is lost by using common factors in
place of dummy variables.
Table 4.3 presents the results from both OLS and ADE with common factors. As
shown for the OLS estimation all the explanatory variables are statistically significant at
the .10 level, and most are significant at the .05 level. The R2 is .4393, which is
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somewhat lower than previous studies, but not uncommon. As expected the total visible
supply, population, years to maturity, and debt per capita are all associated with increased
true interest cost while total expenditures, median incomes, the par amount, and the risk
factors are all associated with increased TIC. Because we have no theoretical reason as
to why the time variable, fiscal year, should enter into TIC linearly even in OLS we
include both a linear (fiscal year) and quadratic (fiscal year squared) time variable. Since
both are statistically significant, and the coefficients change from positive to negative we
can infer quadratic time dependence.
Interpreting the common factors is more abstract, but given the factor loadings
correlation with dummy variables that indicate low, med, and higher credit risk we can
interpret them as all lowering true interest cost, but in different ways. For example, we
can discern that for bond issues that are of medium credit risk indicators of credit
worthiness are more important for lowering TIC compared to other levels of risk because
the coefficient is larger and negative. Also credit indicators for bond issues with low
credit risk are more important to lower TICs than credit indicators for bond issues with
high credit risk. While abstract, these findings are not particularly surprising or different
from the literature on municipal bond credit ratings.
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Table 4.3 OLS vs. ADE Estimation of True Interest Cost
Variables

OLS Estimation
Coefficient
T-Stat

ADE
dy/dx

Total Visible Supply in Billions 1.15E-03*
1.78
4.61E-04
Total Expenditures in Billions -7.69E-04***
-3.11 -4.13E-05
Bond Buyer Index
2.73E-03*
1.76
2.74E-05
Median Income in Millions
-8.52E-02***
-3.31 -6.75E-02
Population in Millions
3.75E-03***
4.1
-3.30E-05***
Log Par
-1.03E-03**
-2.11 -8.38E-04*
Years to Maturity
7.10E-04***
7.42
2.76E-04***
Risk Factor 1 - Low Risk
-1.50E-03***
-3.32 1.34E-05***
Risk Factor 2 - Med Risk
-2.24E-03***
-4.78 -7.14E-06***
Risk Factor 3 - High Risk
-8.05E-04***
-2.54 -9.41E-06
Fiscal Year
1.46E-03**
2.28
2.24E-04*
Fiscal Year Squared
-3.63E-04***
-2.66 -1.76E-05
Debt Per Capita in Millions
4.81E+00***
6.28
6.69E-01
Constant
3.39E-02***
3.34
*** = significance at the .01 level; ** = significance at the .05 level
* = significance at the .10 level; R2 = .4393 (For OLS); n = 461

T-Stat
1.18
-1.4
0.02
-1.54
-0.65
-0.97
8.11
1.93
-3.19
-3.25
2.51
-1.07
1.88

The first set of coefficients in Table 4.3 are from the OLS regression which means
they assume the necessary conditions of classic OLS. The second sets of coefficients
(dy/dx) are the marginal impacts estimated using average derivative estimation, which
assumes no particular functional relationship. Since both methods are root-n consistent
we can directly compare their t-statistics, but without forcing linearization it is to be
expected that the significance of the individual variables would decrease. Even without
forcing linearization we find several statistical significant variables using ADE.
County population, par amount, years to maturity, two of the three factors of risk,
and the time variable is all statistically significant using ADE. Curiously the coefficients
for population and risk factor 1 switch signs while fiscal year squared is not significant at
all. This indicates that increasing the population of a county may on average increase the
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true interest cost, holding everything else constant. Also, the quadratic time dependence
seems to just be a product of linear assumptions since it disappears when that restriction
is lifted. Overall it is apparent that the high significance of variables typically assumed to
be associated with true interest cost, may be a product of the OLS assumptions.
The coefficients for ADE presented in Table 4.3 do not assume anything about the
relationship between the explanatory variables and true interest cost, other than they are
exogenous, have a probability density function, and affect TIC. If we impose a forth
assumption of a single index we can graph the predicted values from the ADE model.
The assumption of a single index is not uncommon, and most parametric models are
single index including OLS regression, Logit, Probit, Tobit, and Poisson regression. A
model is single index if it only depends on the vector x through a single linear

combination ’ β. In this ADE model TIC depends on x through the function of gx’β

where β ∈ R and m: R → R are unknown. Below is a graph of x and gx’β. It can be
seen from this graph that despite the difference in marginal impacts the relationship

between x and gx’β is somewhat linear.

The fairly linear graph of the single index function lends credit to the current
municipal interest literature’s assumption of a linear OLS regression when testing their
hypothesis. Some caution should be taken when making this assumption, especially for
larger values of x. One interpretation would be that the current TIC model is good at

explaining the majority of county bond issues, but not as good when predicting extreme
values. This would be consistent with the general financial transactions literature that
suggest stock prices are leptokurtic and so models are less reliable when predicting
values in the tail of the distribution.
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Figure 4. 2 Graph of the Single Index Function
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Conclusion
Debt financing, and particularly the use of general obligation bonds are an
important tool for most governments. Therefore the interest costs they pay on that debt
can have important consequences for not only the infrastructure built in a community, but
also the tax rates and expenditure levels over the life of the bond. This study presents an
alternative to the traditional modeling technique of municipal interest cost. The
alternative is a semiparametric estimation technique that drops all but the most basic
assumptions about the relationship between a series of explanatory variables and TIC.
The result is that even without the imposition of linearity several explanatory variables
are statistically significant including county population, the par amount, years to
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maturity, several factors or credit risk, and the fiscal year in which the debt was issued.
In addition, after a single index link function is assumed the nonspecified function can be
graphed. The graph shows a fairly linear relationship except for more extreme values.
This result suggests that OLS models that assume linearity are appropriate for the
majority of issues, but may not hold in extreme cases.
These results have several implications for the modeling of municipal interest
cost. First, they give affirmation to current models that assumes linearity in parameters,
which lends validation to previous studies. Second, they suggest that a different model
may be necessary for extreme value bond issues. Third, going forward it offers a
semiparametric technique that can be applied to a variety of public finance problems.
While it is true that ADE provides support for linearity in TIC, but that may not be the
case in other applications of OLS. Future research can benefit from exploring the
linearity assumption of existing models through the use of nonparametric and
semiparametric techniques such as average derivative estimation.

Copyright © Robert A. Greer 2013
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Policy Implications

Introduction
The local government debt tax-exempt market is a growing, and complex section
of public finance. As local governments turn to debt financing in increasing numbers the
factors that attribute to interest costs of that debt have become important for local
government officials and politicians. Further complicating the debt situation of local
governments is the prevalence of a variety of special districts which have the authority to
issue tax-exempt debt. While these special-purpose governments serve many purposes
their general risk assessment, and their effect on the tax-exempt bond market is not well
understood. This dissertation contributes to the literature by breaking down the risk
assessment of the different types of local governments, and how they differ, and
assessing the effect of overlapping governments on municipal interest costs. Finally, this
dissertation advances the econometric techniques needed to evaluate these effects. By
using semiparametric methods a less restrictive estimation method can be used to address
important issues in local government finance.
The introduction chapter of this dissertation lays out the basics of the tax-exempt
bond market and the system of local governments that issue debt in that market. Those
local governments include both traditional municipalities such as cities and counties as
well as a variety of special district types. All of these local governments issue debt to
finance infrastructure needs for their jurisdictions. There exists a variety of constraints on
their ability to issue general obligation debt, which is backed by the full faith and credit
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of the issuing jurisdiction. These constrains include both the legal constraints imposed by
federal and state authorities and the debt capacity of the issuing government. These
constraints result in debt competition in tax-exempt bond markets. Chapter two explores
this competition explicitly and finds that when local governments overlap the amount of
lower level government debt can increase the interest cost on county government bonds.
Credit ratings are also an important component to municipal interest costs. To
explore the credit risk associated with these different types of local governments chapter
three breaks down a series of credit rating decisions by type of local government. All
local government make the choice to purchase a credit rating or not, and they have three
major rating agencies to choose from. Complicating these choices even further is that
many governments choose to be rated by multiple rating agencies. Exploring these
differences is important for understanding the debt issuing process for all local
governments opposed to just the traditionally studied cities and counties. By comparing
traditional municipalities to different special districts it is possible to identify the risk
assessment preferences of different local government types.
Aside from the more general goal of advancing research on local government
debt, debt competition, and local governments this dissertation also applied some lesser
known econometric techniques in the estimation of the various models. Chapter two used
a fairly standard two-stage least squared estimation, but offers a unique approach to
instrumental variables by using a predicted county fixed effect as an instrument for the
amount of overlapping debt outstanding. Chapter three applied a multivariate probit
estimation, which is a useful estimator for a series of limited dependent variable
equations when the errors terms may not be independent. Chapter three also utilized a
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negative binomial estimation, which is a classic estimator that could be used more often
for models of count variables. Chapter four represents the largest departure from normal
estimation methods with the use of a semiparamentric average derivative estimator. The
entire class of semiparametric estimators are underutilized in policy research, but ADE
represents an estimation methods that can be particularly useful for estimating marginal
effects.

Contributions to Literature
The three essays included in this dissertation contribution to several streams of
literature. The first is the overarching literature on municipal finance. Local governments
are an integral part of the system of governance that often receive less attention then state
or national governments. Municipalities have at their disposal a limited number of
financing options. They often have limited tax revenue options, and are tasked with a
wide range of expenditure obligations. An increasing important tool has been their ability
to issue debt for infrastructure needs. There is a small, but strong, tradition of studying
municipal finance, to which this dissertation contributes. Contributions include the
estimation of municipal interest costs, the analysis of credit rating agency selection, the
choice of the number of credit ratings purchased by municipalities, and the effect of
intergovernmental relationships may have on municipal debt.
A second stream of literature this dissertation contributes to is that of special
purpose governments, also known as special districts or public authorities. The majority
of literature on special districts in the context of public finance has focused on the use of
special districts to circumvent state regulations on cities and counties for the purposes of
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additional taxation or bonding powers. Little attention has been given to the unintended,
and costly, fiscal consequences of creating special districts. There has also been little
explorations of how special districts differ from city and county governments in their
credit rating process. The results from chapter three show that school districts are similar
to traditional municipalities while hospital districts, community college districts, and
water districts have different risk factors, and make significantly different decisions in the
rating process.
A third stream of literature is that of vertical fiscal interactions and fiscal
federalism. This is by far the largest body of work, with a long publication record in
economics journals. There have been several theoretical and empirical studies of vertical
fiscal interactions that focus of various types of taxes as described in chapter two.
Vertical tax competition is generally thought to result in over taxation, but there is some
ambiguity as to the direction of the tax reaction. Chapter two of this dissertation extends
the vertical fiscal interaction literature from taxation to debt financing. Instead of asking
what happens to a state government’s tax rates when the federal government increases
their tax rates chapter two examines what happens to county interest costs on general
obligation debt when other local governments increase their borrowing. There is evidence
that local governments are competing in the tax-exempt debt market. When lower level
governments that share a tax base with the county increase their borrowing the county
government pays higher interest costs. This finding shows that vertical fiscal interaction
theory can be applied to local government debt in addition to state level taxation.
The final stream of literature is in applied econometrics. Public administration,
public policy, and public finance publications often lag behind current econometrics in
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the estimation techniques used to address important theoretical concerns. For example,
OLS regressions are often the go-to estimation method for continuous variables.
Regression analysis is a useful, and versatile tool, but it requires some fairly restrictive
assumptions that have to be assumed in order for the results to be valid. Chapter four
demonstrates average derivative estimation can be used in place of an OLS regression.
While there are other semiparametric and nonparametric choices policy analysis is
typically concerned with marginal impacts and ADE is a useful tool in estimating
marginal impacts. By exploring alternative estimation techniques public administration
and public policy studies can make fewer empirical assumptions, and increase the
academic rigor of research methods.

Future Research
While this dissertation has extended the literature in several directions, it also
provides a starting point for future research. One such direction is in debt competition.
There are many research questions that have yet to be answered when applying the fiscal
federalism and vertical externalities framework to issues of public debt. For example,
chapter two looked at the vertical relationship between sub-county debt and county
interest costs. A future research opportunity is to extend that analysis to see if the
relationship holds going from county debt to sub-county interest costs. Or, instead of
examining the effect of debt prices (interest costs) an interesting direction would be to
study the effect of overlapping debt on levels of outstanding debt. Another future
research project would be to look at this relationship at different levels of the federalism
system. For example, the relationship between state and local governments or the
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relationship between federal and state governments. It would also be helpful to control
for horizontal externalities at these various levels of analysis.
Another direction would be applying a semiparametric estimation method to the
limited dependent variable model in chapter three. To do this the semiparametric method
of maximum score estimation (MSE) could be used. MSE is a multinomial choice model
that proves consistency without assuming knowledge of the distribution of the error term
in the model. It can be used as a semiparametric fixed effect model with limited
dependent variables because it differences out the fixed effect, which the probit cannot
do. Furthermore, probit models are not estimated to maximize the number of correct
predictions. If prediction of a discrete outcome is the goal then maximum score estimator
is a more appropriate estimator. MSE is based on maximizing the number of correct
predictions so better in-sample performance compared to probit or maximum likelihood
is assured. This extension of the dissertation would be offer a more efficient estimation,
and further the advancement of semiparmentric methods in public finance research.

Policy and Debt Management Implications
The goal of public finance research is to study, inform, and ultimately help public
finance practitioners in the financial management of public funds. Public debt represents
a growing area financial managers are dealing with, and can encompass millions of
dollars’ worth of tax-payer obligations. Managing debt competition, navigating a
complex tax-exempt bond market, and dealing with credit rating agencies are all salient
topics where management practices can be informed by academic research.
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One method for managing the externalities associated with intrastate debt
competition is to centralize debt management services. Generally, centralized debt
management occurs at the state level through a dedicated agency which monitors debt
issued by the state and local governments and insures that debt policies are followed. A
centralized debt management requires jurisdictions and public authority boards to submit
their debt request to a central office. Each request for debt finance essentially competes
against the others based on economic and political merits. By centralizing debt issues
local government avoid the competition in the tax-exempt bond market. One example of
a centralizing debt management strategy would be to use a state bond bank. A bond bank
periodically issues bonds which are then loaned back to sub-jurisdictions based on formal
requests. In addition to eliminating the competition factor local jurisdictions benefit from
savings achieved by sharing the fixed costs of bond issuance and other economies of
scale.
Another debt management strategy at the state level would be to limit the
creation, and power of special districts. Excluding school districts special districts often
represent higher credit risk bond issues. Since the addition of special districts can
increase county bond interest costs (chapter 2) an alternative strategy could be to restrict
special district bonding authority, but allow them to contract with counties or cities. By
only allowing counties and cities to issue debt, but then contracting the construction,
management, and maintenance of infrastructure to special districts debt competition is
eliminated. This replaces negative debt externalities and promotes management
efficiencies.
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The recent years of a sluggish economy and meager tax collections have pressured
state and local governments to issue more debt. As the aggregate debt burden increases
the competition among overlapping jurisdictions intensifies. It is important for public
managers and policy makers to better understand the nature of intrastate competition and
the repercussions of acute competition on interest costs and access to the bond market.
Strategies to mitigate the negative effects of debt competition should be considered and
implemented. The magnitude of state and local debt is not likely to diminish quickly, so
intrastate debt competition will remain relevant even after the economy recovers and tax
revenues again begin to grow.
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore several distinct but related questions
on local government debt issues. Through the various chapters this dissertation advances
the field of municipal finance. These essays explore intergovernmental relationships and
differences in types of local governments through the lens of public debt. All three essays
and the introduction chapter deal with local government debt issuances, but from
different perspectives. The complex system of local governance including the
relationship among various municipalities and special districts is explored through the
framework of debt financing. The effects of these local governments sharing taxes bases
as well as the differences across them in their assessment of credit risk are considered.
The result is a better understanding of local government debt, which can be used to
construct more efficient debt management policies.
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Appendix A: Chapter 3 Continuous Variables by Number of Ratings
Variable
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity

Mean
Std. Dev.
Not Rated
40.85
163.74
5.13
14.66
2,357.64
10949.40
19.50
8.55
One Rating
26.51
134.74
10.31
19.45
1,671.98
9034.38
19.27
7.36
Two Ratings
248.02
541.40
46.25
126.24
15,435.95
34310.76
18.41
7.18
Three Ratings
763.78
927.43
84.97
170.24
47,253.62
63823.24
18.47
7.34
All Bonds
156.79
462.11
25.53
88.25
9,482.41
29738.82
19.02
7.64
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Min

Max

0.03
2471.00
0.00
440.97
0.00 173621.20
1.00
40.00
0.01
3935.86
0.01
443.66
2.01 274954.20
1.00
40.00
0.38
4841.85
0.01
3755.57
3.11 274954.20
1.00
40.00
6.92
4110.77
0.07
2495.96
22.79 274480.10
1.00
40.00
0.01
4841.85
0.00
3755.57
0.00 274954.20
1.00
40.00

Appendix B: Chapter 3 Continuous Variables by Government Type
Variable
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity
Population
Debt Outstanding
Assessed Value
Years to Maturity

Mean

Std. Dev.

City
153.95
371.62
20.18
78.87
9,562.69 25,073.09
17.86
7.19
County
537.40
924.34
29.43
59.90
37,166.41 62,061.48
15.55
7.31
Community College District
825.80
852.35
39.91
73.25
56,030.77 56,370.75
18.03
7.13
Health District
466.79
892.67
35.14
83.89
19,369.38 51,034.66
17.79
8.78
Other Special District
1,376.19 1,913.55
306.98
608.39
30,422.54 86,264.55
19.87
10.54
School District
82.81
169.68
33.38
62.34
5,392.76 12,225.86
19.15
8.63
Water District
84.62
447.31
14.33
40.32
3,846.86 28,287.77
21.22
6.38
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Min

Max

0.03
2,099.45
0.00
2,495.96
2.19 144,358.30
1.00
40.00
0.93
4,110.77
0.05
718.45
181.23 274,480.10
1.00
40.00
3.83
2,471.00
0.22
486.76
431.36 173,621.20
1.00
30.00
1.75
3,596.09
0.01
490.13
175.06 266,755.90
1.00
39.00
1.45
4,841.85
0.10
3,755.57
4.59 274,954.20
2.00
40.00
0.10
1,316.35
0.00
831.65
5.01 104,937.20
1.00
40.00
0.01
3,886.21
0.01
566.33
0.00 266,752.10
1.00
40.00

Appendix C: Chapter 3 Complete Simultaneous Multivariate Probit Results
Table 6 - Simultaneous Multivariate Probit Results
VARIABLES
S&P
Moody’s
Fitch
S&P Rated
-1.146***
0.00307
(0.0947)
(0.110)
Moody's Rated
-0.266***
(0.101)
City
0.201**
0.0812
0.294***
(0.0880)
(0.0795)
(0.0857)
Community College
-0.605***
-0.498***
-0.791***
District
(0.181)
(0.162)
(0.175)
Health District
-0.847***
-0.538**
0.486*
(0.268)
(0.258)
(0.285)
Special District
-0.647**
-1.942***
-0.165
(0.324)
(0.379)
(0.344)
School District
-0.225**
0.0996
-0.418***
(0.113)
(0.112)
(0.138)
Water District
-0.200**
-1.857***
-1.700***
(0.0985)
(0.0962)
(0.149)
General Obligation
0.426**
1.443***
0.446*
(0.208)
(0.267)
(0.250)
Revenue
0.428*
1.582***
0.654**
(0.220)
(0.272)
(0.256)
Negotiated Sale
2.261***
2.407***
1.744***
(0.0660)
(0.0928)
(0.138)
Competitive Sale
2.068***
2.701***
1.296***
(0.0711)
(0.0963)
(0.144)
Bond Insurance
0.740***
0.834***
0.0290
(0.0416)
(0.0473)
(0.0583)
Total Tax Rate
-0.149*
-0.708***
0.635***
(0.0833)
(0.0905)
(0.124)
Population
0.731***
0.641***
2.443***
(0.270)
(0.195)
(0.215)
Years to Maturity
0.00109
0.000343
0.00434*
(0.00233)
(0.00228)
(0.00259)
Debt Outstanding
0.00195*** 0.00243*** 0.00119***
(0.000655) (0.000480)
(0.000408)
Assessed Value
4.79e-06
4.92e-07
-2.36e-05***
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Rho

General Issuing Cost
Overlaps Multiple
Counties
In a MSA
Constant

(3.91e-06)
0.653***
(0.191)
0.271**

(2.88e-06)
0.294
(0.200)
0.547***

(3.15e-06)
0.407*
(0.235)
0.145

(0.116)
0.209***
(0.0440)
-2.524***
(0.220)

(0.101)
0.670***
(0.0462)
-3.412***
(0.282)

(0.107)
0.650***
(0.0641)
-4.040***
(0.285)

S&P-Moodys Rho
S&P-Fitch Rho
Moodys-Fitch Rho
Observations
Standard errors in
parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1

9,238

9,238
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9,238

-0.146***
(0.0451)
-0.0984*
(0.0528)
-0.0921*
(0.0553)
9,238

Appendix D: Chapter 4 OLS with Dummy Variables Regression
Table 3 - OLS with Dummy Variables
Dependent Variable - TIC
Coefficients Robust Std.
T-Stat
Err.
Total Visible Supply in Billions
0.0012 0.0007
Total Expenditures in Billions
-0.0007 0.0003
Debt Per Capita in Millions
4.7658 0.7496
Bond Buyer Index
0.0045 0.0020
Median Income in Millions
-0.0986 0.0281
Population in Millions
0.0032 0.0010
Log Par
-0.0010 0.0005
Years to Maturity
0.0007 0.0001
Competitive Sale
-0.0029 0.0008
Bond Insurance
-0.0021 0.0014
AA
-0.0026 0.0015
A
-0.0063 0.0022
BBB
-0.0010 0.0016
No Credit
0.0033 0.0016
fy05
0.0017 0.0013
fy06
0.0042 0.0014
fy07
0.0044 0.0014
fy08
0.0018 0.0014
fy09
0.0014 0.0017
_cons
0.0248 0.0120
*** = significance at the .01 level; ** = significance at the .05
2

* = significance at the .10 level; R = .4511; n = 461
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1.82
-2.33
6.36
2.27
-3.51
3.12
-2.09
7.28
-3.83
-1.57
-1.73
-2.87
-0.64
2.05
1.31
2.93
3.13
1.28
0.81
2.07
level

Significance
*
**
***
**
***
***
**
***
***
*
***
**
***
***

**
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Management Intern, formerly World Savings

Research Interests
Public finance, municipal securities, state and local government, research methods
Teaching Interests
Public budgeting and finance, research methods, state and local government, public
policy, public administration
Dissertation
Greer, Robert A. Three Essays on Local Government Debt. University of Kentucky,
2013.
Honors and Awards
NASPAA Emerging Scholars Award
Hatton W. Sumner Scholar Award
Pi Alpha Alpha Honor Society
Phi Kappa Phi Honor Society
Organizations and Associations
2009 Leadership Team, Public Administration Student Association
2004 Vice President of Public Relations, Trinity Economic Society
Student Member, American Society for Public Administration
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Student Member, Association for Budgeting and Financial Management
Student Member, International City/County Management Association

Publications and Papers
Forthcoming Book Chapter:
Co-authored with Dwight V. Denison Chapter 8: State Competition for Debt
Resources in Sustaining the States: The Fiscal Viability of American State
Governments edited by Marilyn Rubin and Katherine Willoughby CRC Press
(2013).
Working Papers:
“Semiparametric Modeling of Municipal Interest Cost: Average Derivative
Estimation” (with J.S. Butler)
“A Theory of Vertical Debt Externalities in Overlapping Governments”
“Selection Bias in Types of Local Government Credit Rating Agency Choice: A
Nonparametric Approach”
“Does intrastate competition in segmented municipal bond markets affect interest
costs?” (with Dwight Denison)
Conference Presentations
“Vertical Debt Externalities in Overlapping Governments” A study of overlapping local
governments and the effect of lower level government debt on higher level government
interest cost. This paper has been accepted, and will be presented, at the Association for
Public Policy Analysis and Management 2012 annual conference. This paper will also be
presented at the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration
Emerging Scholars Award panel.
“Does intrastate competition in segmented municipal bond markets affect interest costs?”
A co-authored paper with Dwight Denison using preferred habitat and market
segmentation theory to examine the effect of total general obligation debt on municipal
interest cost. This paper has been accepted, and will be presented, at the Association for
Budgeting and Financial Management 2012 annual conference.
“State Competition for Debt Resources” A co-authored chapter with Dwight Denison
from the forthcoming book Sustaining the States: The Fiscal Viability of American State
Governments. This chapter has been accepted, and will be presented, at the Association
for Budgeting and Financial Management 2012 annual conference.
“Semiparametric Modeling of Municipal Interest Cost: An Average Derivative
Estimation.” A co-authored paper with J.S. Butler using average derivative estimation to
explore linearity in local government tax-backed debt interest costs. This paper has been
accepted, and will be presented, at the Midwest Econometrics Group 2012 annual
conference.
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“Breaking Down the Adoption of Build America Bonds: A Hazard Model Approach”
This study draws upon the causal factors outlined in policy diffusion literature to
ultimately answer the question of why so few local governments used Build America
Bonds. Research in progress. This paper was presented in the poster session of the
Association for Budgeting and Financial Management in October 2011.
“A Bayesian Approach to Empirical Issues in the Measurement of Management Quality
in States.” Dr. Skip Krueger, Dr. Robert W. Walker, and I are co-authoring a paper which
applies a Bayesian approach to the Government Performance Project (GPP) to develop a
new measurement of managerial quality. Research in progress. This paper was presented
at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference held in April 2010.
“Outcomes-based assessment: how it is achieved and what it tells us.” A university Next
Generation (N-Gen) course redesign comparative study with Dr. Robert Insley. Research
in progress. This paper was presented at the 10th Annual Assessment Conference at
Texas A&M University which was held in February 2010.
“Cultural and linguistic influences on student evaluation of teaching effectiveness
(SETE) instruments.” A study of how SETE responses are influenced when completed
by international students with Paula Yaeger and Dr. Robert Insley. Research in progress.
This paper was presented at the 54th Annual Conference of the Comparative &
International Education Society in March 2010.
Teaching and Course Development
University of Kentucky Department of Political Science
Fall 2012 Political Science Research Methods
University of Kentucky Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
Spring 2011 Teaching Assistant for PhD Seminar in Public Finance
Spring 2011 Teaching Assistant for Public Funds Management
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